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Vigilantism has a long history in the United States
stretching back to the Regulator movement in South Carolina
in 1767. These extralegal movements are distinguished from
spontaneous and ephemeral mob activity by their regular
。rganization and limited life-span. The San Francisc。
Committee of Vigilance of 1856 was the largest vigilante
movement in American history. After a summer of vigilantism
2that included four hangings , the committee turned t。
politics and formed the People ’ s Party which dominated San
Francisco's city government for the next decade. The 1856
committee is generally considered the great exemplar of
American vigilantism and has received considerable attention
from scholars.
San Francisc。’ s 1856 vigilance committee regarded
itself as a reorganization of that city's 1851 Committee of
Vigilance. Like its more illustrious offspring, the 1851
committee hanged four men and banished many others. The
vigilantes of 1851 did not , however , form a political party.
Because of this some scholars have considered the work of
the 1851 committee to be incomplete and have deemed it less
worthy of attention than the committee of 1856. But in
attempting to understand the intellectual grounding of San
Francisco's vigilantes , this view is incorrect. The
vigilantes in 1856 felt they were carrying on the work of
the 1851 committee. Thus , to comprehend the events of 1856
it is necessary to understand the inspiration for the 1851
vigilance committee. The key to vigilantism in San
Francisco lies in 1851.
An understanding of the spirit which animates
vigilantism is valuable because of what it reveals about
American concepts of self-government. Vigilantes conceive
。f their authority as springing from the same source as does
that of the government: the people. San Francisco provides
3an extraordinary case for the study of notions about popular
sovereignty in antebellum America.
In order to make sense of what happened in San
Francisco in 1851 this thesis first analyzes the political
thought and philosophy that had developed in America to that
time. It also examines the changing social ethos that came
to emphasize equality. The two vigilance committees of San
Francisco were a consummation of the political and social
deveJ.opments of antebellum America. I have relied on the
extensive secondary literature for my interpretation.
San Francisco in 1851 was in the midst of a singular
episode in American history: the gold rush. The promise of
riches made California the reification of the ideals of
equality and opportunity that matured during the antebellum
era. For the exploration of California and San Francisco I
have used secondary sources and some primary sources ,
especially the Alta California , one of San Francisc。’ s
newspapers. This reliance on the 표A후효 was in part due t。
its availability. The attitudes toward vigilantism
expressed by the 표L후르 were similar to other California
newspapers. All of them supported the vigilantes in 1851.
The episode of vigilantism in 1851 was a formative
experience for the city of San Francisco. It served as an
example of popular action and helped to define the limits of
such action for the city's residents. The relationship
between popular action and government was illuminated in San
4Francisco. Because of the way in which the people were
endowed with power , they could create government and later
defy that same government without destroying their creation.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
From 1856 until the mid-1860s the People ’ s Party
dominated San Francisco politics and government. It was a
non-partisan movement , heavily influenced by the city ’ s
merchant class. Their motto was "No Party , No Creed , N。
Sectional Issues."' What was remarkable about the party
was not its membership or programs , but its genesis: it was
born directly from the nation ’ s largest organized vigilante
movement. The organization ’ s defiance of law was transmuted
into legal authority.2
, Quoted in Philip J. Ethington , "The Structures of
Urban Political Life: Political Culture in San Francisco ,
1850-1880" (Ph.D. diss. , Stanford University , 1991) , 138.
2 On the 1856 Committee of Vigilance Hubert Howe
Bancroft , The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft , vol. 37 ,
Pooular Tribunals , vol. 2 , (San Francisco: The History
Company Publishers , 1887) , remains the best narrative of the
committee ’ s activities. Ethington views the committee as a
political movement and thus as an illustration of San
Francisc。’ s unique political culture. Other interpretations
are offered by Robert M. Senkewicz , Viailantes in Gold Rush
San Francisc。 (Stanford , California: Stanford University
Press , 1985); Roger W. Lotchin , San Francisco , 1846-1856 ,
From Hamlet to City (Lincoln , Nebraska and London:
University of Nebraska Press , 1974); Peter R. Decker ,
Fortunes and Failures: White Collar Mobilitv in Nineteenth-
Century San FranciE드으 (Cambridge , Massachusetts and London:
Harvard University Press , 1978); Richard Maxwell Brown ,
Strain of Violence: Historical Studies of American violence
and Viailantism (New York: Oxford University Press , 1975) ,
2The 1856 Committee of Vigilance claimed it was
responding to lawlessness , official corruption , and election
fraud. Two killings stimulated the organization (really the
reorganization) of the committee of vigilance. The shooting
。f u.S. Marshal William Richardson by gambler Charles Cora
and that of blustering newspaper editor James King of
William by Democratic political hack James Casey resurrected
an earlier vigilance committee that had been active in 1851.
In 1856 the vigilance committee enrolled some 8 ,000
citizens. They hanged four men (including Cora and Casey) ,
deported more than two-dozen others , and took political
control of San Francisco. Richard Maxwell Brown maintains
that the 1856 committee "had much to do with creating the
favorable image of American vigilantism in the nineteenth
century."3 Vigilantism turned into a political and
cultural triumph.
Scholars have concentrated on the commit~ee of 1856.
It was , after all , the largest vigilante movement in
all of whom emphasize the vigilance committee ’ s mercantile
leadership and nativism in their interpretations. Brown
understands vigilantism as part of a pattern of violence in
American culture. He considers the 1856 committee a
"turning point in American vigilantism" from a frontier
response to disorder to a "quest for solutions to the
problems of a new urban America" (135). R. A. Burchell ’ s ,
The San Francisco Irish , 1848-1880 (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press , 1980) is valuable
in regard to nativism in San Francisco.
3 Brown , 135.
3American history.4 But in their eagerness to focus on San
Francisco in 1856 they have too often skimmed over the
events in San Francisco in 1851. In that year the original ,
albeit much smaller , ~~~ 년 rancisco committee exercised power
in the emporium of the 낀『니ific. Historians have failed t。
examine completely and carefully the milieu in which the
1851 vigilance committee formed and the inescapable
conclusion that the 1851 committee was a necessary
antecedent to the formation of the 1856 committee. The 1856
co~~ittee was but a reorganization of the earlier committee.
The professed aim of the 1851 committee , to rid the city of
an organization of criminals which they thought infested it ,
met with public approbation. The 1851 committee served the
city as a sYmbol of public spirited men joined together t。
pursue the common good. The vigilantes of 1856 cloaked
themselves in this image of civic dedication. The keys t。
understanding the adoption of vigilantism in San Francisco
must be traced to 1851.
The 1851 committee was a product of gold rush
California. Like its more impressive offspring, the
committee was driven by a desire to impose social order.
The vigilantes ’ vision of social order was based on the
values of the American middle class that emerged as a
powerful force in the culture engendered by the nineteenth-
century market economy. But at the height of the gold rush
4 Brown , 135.
4in 1851 , San Francisco was hardly a model of middle class
propriety. And not all the vigilantes in 1851 were ready to
accept the political duties inherent in enforcing order in a
conventional manner , through politics and legal mechanisms.
It was not until 1856 that vigilantism culminated in an
effective political organization.
Organized vigilantism like that in San Francisco sheds
light on a concept fundamental to the political culture of
the United States: popular sovereignty. The belief that
social and political authority rests in citizens , not
government , legitimated -- powerfully and ironically --
extralegal action for San Franciscans.
Popular sovereignty is a malleable concept. In its
unadulterated form it atomizes political power. According
to this presumption the sum of political power in the polity
is divided and an equal part apportioned to each member.
Individuals join together to form powerful groups and those
which hold the preponderance of the polity ’ s power , or
sovereignty , determine the course of the community.
Political authority is intrinsic in each person , and this
creates a keen sense of personal sovereignty , but groups
dominate society.
Because the doctrine of popular sovereignty holds that
ultimate authority rests in people , and not government , it
places the formal institutions of government on an insecure
foundation. The implication of the 간uthority to make laws
5and governments is revolutionary. While unchecked
government can turn into tyranny , unchecked popular
sovereignty can degenerate into anarchy. Americans fear
both and have never found a perfect balance between the two.
Instead , there has historically been a recurring testing of
the boundaries to governmental and popular action. Gold
rush California provides us with the best examples of one
strain of this probing of limits -- well-organized
vigilantism.
We customarily identify popular action -- the physical
manifestation of political power -- with voting , working for
a campaign , and using words , written or spoken , to influence
someone in the government or other voters. Our established
governments are delineated by constitutions , and other laws ,
which limit not only what the government can do , but how
citizens can influence government. Indeed , the federal
Constitution contains no mechanism for its subversion. It
does not recognize popular constituent sovereignty: the
authority to create , alter , or destroy government.
Strikingly in this regard , after the traumatic experience of
the Civil War the guarantees that appeared in many state
constitutions , that the people could change their form of
government at will , disappeared. But during the antebellum
years a notion about the right of revolution was a
substantial tenet of American ideology.
The moral imperative of popular sovereignty -- that
6the people will always determine the course of their
government -- is an empty promise. Southern s 1.!pporters of
the Confederate States of America and the Rhode Island
suffragists led by Thomas Dorr in 1842 , discovered this. 5
Righteous platitudes about self-government are a pathetic
defense against the state ’ s utilization of violence as a
means of political control. Popular sovereignty means
nothing without the willingness to physically implement it.
This leads to the crux of the matter: is vigilantism , if
popularly supported , a legitimate manifestation of popular
sovereignty? The answer has to be yes.
Hubert Howe Bancroft maintained that "if the people are
supreme , they cannot create a power superior to themselves
and still remain supreme. They cannot bind themselves t。
。ne another in fetters so strong that all together , or the
ruling majority , cannot instantly break them. 얘 Of course
the authentic fulfillment of popular sovereignty -- majority
rule -- can be as despotic and violent as government
repression. There is nothing inherently tolerant about
popular government. And Americans never have become
5 On the Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island in 1842 see
George M. Dennison , The Dorr War: Republicanism on Trial ,
1831-1861 (Lexington , Kentucky: The University Press of
Kentucky , 1976); Patrick T. Conley , Democracv in Declirle:
Rhode Island ’ s Constitutional Development , 1776-1841
(Providence: Rhode Island Historical Society , 1977); Marvin
E. Gettleman , The Dorr Rebellion: A Studv in American
Radicalism , 1833-1849 (New York: Random House , 1973).
6 Bancroft , vol. 36 , 22-23.
7reconciled to a truly popular form of government. 7
Vigilantism does not recognize formal , legal limits on
behavior. It is , by definition , defiant of government. As
such , it represents the frightening side of popular
sovereignty: physical force. But the vigilantes in San
Francisco during the 1850s were not out-of-control mobs.
(Though the crowd dynamic -- that people will take actions
as part of a crowd that they would not were they alone --
played a part in the events in 1851 and 1856.) They were
well-organized and had their own constitutions. Only a few
men were actually punished by the vigilance committees. The
vigilantes placed limits on themselves.
The problematic aspects of popular sovereignty -- how
the will of the people is determined , what limits , if any ,
are placed on the popular power , and what the relationship
is between governmental authority and the original authority
。f the people -- are illuminated by an investigation int。
the events of the summer of 1851 in San Francisco. The
results of this investigation do not always sustain popular
sovereignty as the lofty and flawless process of government
Americans so often believe it to be. Nor do the results
show that powerful , popular , illegal movements inevitably
7 Bancroft , revealing the pressures of the post-Civil
War era in which he wrote , later amended his far reaching
legitimation of vigilantism and popular sovereignty with an
assertion of his devotion to the union. "I am by no means a
secessionist ," he wrote , the "federal alliance was made for
life and is not subject to divorce." Bancroft , vol. 37 ,
677.
8destabilize government. The insurrection in San Francisc。
during 1851 did not topple government. It was an important
confrontation regarding the limits of popular action in the
United States.
This thesis considers first how economic and political
changes affected the development of popular sovereignty in
antebellum America and the implications this held for social
control. Next , we examine the context of gold rush
California and the complexion the crude mining camps gave t。
it. Then , in chapter three it explains the attitudes of San
Franciscans toward government and social control. Within
the context established in the first three chapters , the
final chapter looks into crime , the 1851 vigilance
committee , and the ambivalent response of San Franciscans t。
vigilantism.
CHAPTER II
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA: THE CONFIGURATION
OF A POPULAR SOCIAL ORDER
The vigilantes who seized power in San Francisco were
not rejecting their political heritage , but acting it out.
Americans in the 1850s understood sovereignty as something
that existed independent of government. Power was thought
to be inherent in men , not institutions. The members of the
polity -- those who were white , male , and of age -- were the
primal source of authority. Although to twentieth century
sensibilities this seems a narrow , exclusive conception of
political participation , in the nineteenth century it was a
radical and expansive concept of the politically empowered
citizen. Those who qualified as citizens experienced an
unparalleled and unprecedented political and social
equality. This widespread political authority had serious
implications for the enforcement of social order. It
magnified group pressure to conform. Yet these same
powerful and equal individuals surrendered tremendous power
to their elected (and appointed) representatives. There was
an internal inconsistency in American popular sovereignty as
to whether power was exercised by the many or the few. T。
10
comprehend the meaning that popular sovereignty had for
nineteenth century Americans in California , it is necessary
to go back to the country ’ s founding period.
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
In the eighteenth century David Hume was astonished at
the ease with which "men resign their own sentiments and
passions to those of their rulers."' In a society which is
based on popular sovereignty , such as the United States , it
is all the more surprising that the people , the many , will
submit to the few.
Part of the reason for this submission to the few is
the difficulty of actually involving the many in the work of
governance. It would be a formidable task to include all
the enfranchised members of even a small community in every
decision. But there is a darker reason behind the
reluctance to empower the people to exercise authority
without someone or some mechanism to mediate that power. It
is the fear that large groups of people often act in a
dangerous and ungovernable ways. It is dreaded that
individuals , under the influence of a crowd , will cast off
their roles as citizens and become the thoughtless
appendages of an uncontrollable mob. Iudividual governors
1 Quoted in Edmund S. Morgan , Inventina the People:
The Rise of Popular Sovereiqntv in Enqland and America (New
York and London: W.W. Norton and Company , 1988) , 13.
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can be held accountable , mobs cannot be.
Vigilantism , because it is not an exercise of power
through formally organized procedures! necessarily
approximates mob behavior and for this reason is often
feared. Vigilantism appears as an uncontrollable
phenomenon. Yet vigilantes , when they act with popular
approval -- as those in San Francisco -- can also seem to be
a direct embodiment of the people ’ s will. Vigilantism thus
exposes a paradox within popular sovereignty: how can power
be exercised in a restrained fashion (i.e. through formal
procedures) and the people still retain a real sovereign
authority over government?
John Locke ’ s theory of the social contract assumes that
individuals are free and equal in a state of nature. In
joining together in society , through government , they give
up some of their liberty in return for security.2
Individual freedom is checked by agreed upon standards of
conduct. But unfettered majority rule nullifies the
security the social contract promises to provide ‘ Strong
groups can subjugate minorities or individuals. without
restraints , popular sovereignty only institutionalizes brute
force.
What , then , are the limits on popular action? The easy
2 I follow Joyce Appleby on Locke. See her
Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Reoublican Vision of
the 1790s (New York and London: New York University Press ,
1984) , 20-21.
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answer is that such limits can be institutionalized in
government through law. But Americans have resisted
surrendering sovereignty to government. The development of
popular sovereignty in America is important because it
conceived of government (and law) as being directly
sanctioned by the people. With this conception of popular
sovereignty law and government can only derive power from
the people; they cannot stand on their own authority. This
view of sovereignty obscured the difference between legal
and popular action -- that is , the difference between the
authority that empowers government to act and that with
which the people are endowed.
The bromide that the United States is a nation of laws ,
not men , reveals a real , and warranted , fear about the
implications of popular government. Only consensus can
really restrain the populace. When original sovereignty is
invested in the people , the durability of such a consensus
b~comes problematic. Conventions and propriety are all that
ultimately stand between civil order and civil war. The
United States , in its Revolution of 1776 , was literally
created by physical force. That force was justified on the
grounds of its popular basis. According to this creed the
people have the right to alter or abolish government when it
no longer suits their needs. Unless the existing government
goes quietly (which experience suggests is unlikely) then
the conflict will likely turn violent. One implication of
13
popular sovereignty is , ~hus ， an extraordinarily unstable
society.
To deal with this inherent instability in their form of
government , Americans have emphasized common standards of
conduct. Any society must blend individual expectations
into group expectations to achieve a semblance of order. In
America both individuals and groups (majorities or
pluralities) are empowered: individuals through accepted
notions about natural rights and groups through legal and
physical means , which amount to either institutionalized or
informal coercion. Americans have often seen gove~nment as
a check on group coercion and as a protection of individual
rights. However , when government appears to fail to d。
these things , Americans can turn to popular sovereignty. In
this regard the doctrine of popular sovereignty endows the
people , regardless of government action or inaction , with
ultimate power and the right to exercise this power outside
。f government. It was this notion of a power that resides
in the people , independent of government , that informed San
Franciscans who turned to vigilantism in 1851.
The American tradition has exalted , in a paradoxical
fashion , both the individual and the majority. In a similar
way the legitimacy of the constituted authorities and the
supreme political power of the people have each been
affirmed. Though both of the written icons of the American
tradition , the Constitution and the Declaration of
14
Independence , affirm popular sovereignty , each document
treats the concept differently. The Constitution
understands popular sovereignty as interrelated with
government; it needs government for expression. The
Declaration comprehends the deeper , destructive power of
popular sovereignty. Natural rights empower the people t。
do violence to government. At different times in American
history these contradictions have been exposed. In the
process fundamental elements of the American political
tradition have been laid bare. In San Francisco in 1851
vigilantes revolted against government , but ironically did
not try to destroy government.
The conflict between individual rights and majority
rule has been accommodated within the American political
system , though not without serious , and sometimes deadly ,
disagreement. It has been more problematic how direct
challenges by the people to the legitimacy of an established
government could be contained within the existing political
system. This dualism in American thinking has been informed
by the Constitution ’ s promise of stability and the
Declaration ’ s revolutionary creed. On the one hand ,
Americans have faith in the perfection of our republican or
democratic form of government. But this "perfect" form of
government rests on an unstable foundation: popular
sovereignty. The durability of government depends on the
whims of a sovereign people. What happens when the
15
government and the people , each claiming to be the
legitimate repository of authority , confront each other?
It was the possibility or probability of such
collisions that convinced European critics of the newly
founded United States that its political system , based on
popular sovereignty , was inherently unstable. They believed
that the masses would submit only temporarily , if at all , t。
government authority. The experience of the United States
has not borne this out , however. Access to political power
has enlarged over time. An ever-increasing political
inclusiveness has disposed more and more people to feel a
personal stake in the legitimacy of this form of government.
A conviction on the part of the people that government is
the highest expression of popular sovereignty (regardless of
whether this conviction is true , false , or problematic)
subdued , for the most part , the destructive aspecζs of
popular sovereignty. American political culture has
strengthened itself through an ability to harness a
revolutionary doctrine to government.
This consensus about existing governments strengthened
them: they had (presumably) been entrusted with power
through popular means. Additionally , theiL very existence
gave them access to political authority and accustomed
citizens to their presence and exercise of that authority.
The durability of American governments , at all levels , has
largely rested on these bases. This is not to imply that
16
there have not been serious conflicts between the
authorities and the people in the united States. It would
be surprising , given the American faith in popular
sovereignty , if such conflicts did not arise. What has been
astonishing is the ability of Americans , when faced with a
contest between people and government , to insist upon the
authority of both. Groups of Americans have occasionally
been able to assert popular authority (in the face of duly
established civil authorities) based on the Revolutionary
doctrines embodied in the Declaration of Independence
without repudiating the political system that produced the
government they were defying.
In 1851 San Francisco vigilantes successfully
challenged existing and popularly elected governments (both
state and local) and but did not attempt to undermine or
。verthrow them. The vigilance committee simply supplanted
the authorities in certain situations temporarily. An
organization that can best be described as "middle class ,"
。penly defied government.
The role of a distinctly American notion of popular
sovereignty in instances of vigilantism has not been
adequately examined. It was this notion , along with the
circumstances of gold rush California , that furnished the
impetus for the 1851 vigilance committee.
The 1851 vigilance committee was a part of a series of
manifestations of San Francisc。’ s political and social life
17
and was not separate from the city ’ s usual existence. Nor
was it isolated from American traditions. The committee
provides valuable insights into how the sovereign people
exercise their will and what limits , if any , exist t。
restrict their action.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN AMERICA
In theory popular sovereignty derives its authority
from God or nature. Self-government is considered to be the
natural order of things. But in a practical sense it relies
。n consensus or violence (or coercion) for its authority.
Sovereignty , in order to be effective , requires an agreement
about its legitimacy. Part of the potency of American
popular sovereignty is that its inclusiveness has
strengthened a consensus about the political system.
The less attractive source of power is the coercive and
potentially violent capacity of an effective majority.
Authority assumes a just claim to the use of coercion or
violence in order to carry out the sovereign will. A
powerful consensus about the morality of popular government
has helped keep violence partially submerged in American
political life. When large groups exert their sovereignty
in a physical manner , the appropriate response of the
18
government and other citizens is not always clear. 3
This tension between intellectual and physical
sovereignty is real in the United States because of the
manner in which popular sovereignty developed there.
Americans claim both of these phases of sovereignty.
Americans also assume rights to both political types of
popular sovereignty: the legislative power and the
constituent power , the one being the power to make laws and
the other the power to make governments. This was a sharp
break with the English roots of American government. As
Edmund Morgan has noted , England never did achieve "a
formulation and establishment of its constitution by a
popular sanction or authority separate from its
government. “ Parliament exercised popular sovereignty in
3 The most obvious example is the American Civil War.
The forcible repatriation of the Southern states was a
repudiation of popular sovereignty. Another striking
example is the Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island in 1842. The
state ’ s existing government refused to recognize a popularly
ratified constitution which would have instituted a new
state government. The rebellion was forcibly suppressed. A
case which resulted from the rebellion came before the
United States Supreme Court. In Luther v. Borden the court
made clear that it would not enforce the exercise of
constituent sovereignty. The implication was that the
establishment of new governments , even if popularly
supported , would have to be achieved through violence. See
George M. Dennison , The Dorr War: Reoublicanism on Trial ,
1831-1861 (Lexington , Kentucky: The University Press of
Kentucky , 1976); Patrick T. Conley , Democracv in Decline:
Rhode Island ’ s Constitutional Develooment , 1776-1841
(Providence: Rhode Island Historical Society, 1977); Marvin
E. Gettleman , The Dorr Rebellion: A Studv in American
Radicalism , 1833-1849 (New York: Random House , 1973).
4 Morgan , 108 , 120.
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England. In the United States , conversely , a popular
sanction separate from the government exercised the
constituent power that created the nation.
Part of the reason for this difference between England
and the United States is the oft-noted fact that the latter
had a very definite historical past. Even the colonial
experience was not particularly distant to antebellum
Americans. The first permanent settlement , at Jamestown ,
dated only to 1607. The claim of Americans to be a distinct
and independent people was even more recent: 1776. This
independent people had constituted its own national
government by 1789. There was , in contrast to England ,
nothing mysterious about the role of the people in creating
their government in America. The people had presented
themselves in a physical way and exercised their constituent
power. Because of the temporal limits on the American
experience , Americans had access to the origins of their
government.
While the creation of the American nation was informed
by a broad range of ideological and practical concepts ,5 it
5 The literature on the ideology of the founding is
extensive. Indispensable is Gordon S. Wood , Creation of the
American Reoublic , 1776-1787 (New York: W.W. Norton , 1972).
Some useful journal articles are Isaac Kramnick , "The 'Great
National Discussion ’: The Discourse of Politics in 1787 ,"
William and Mary Ouarterly 45 (January 1988) , 3-32; Richard
C. Sinopoli , "Liberalism, Republicanism and the
Constitution ," 묘으추후도y 19 , no. 3 (1987) , 331-352; Joyce
Appleby , "Republicanism in Old and New Contexts ," William
and Mary Ouarterly 43 (January 1986) , 20-34; Peter S. Onuf ,
"Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography
20
was firmly grounded in the belief that government was
created by an agreement (or contract) among men. This
liberal view saw society as composed of equal individuals
with diverse interests and conceptions of good. The
community presupposed the individual. Rooted in Lockean
views of men as naturally equal and possessing liberty in
their natural state , individuals agreed to society for
reasons of security. This security gave them independence
to pursue their own chosen aims. Regulation of indivi선uals
was justified only insofar as they had freely given up a
portion of their natural liberty. Citizens achieved virtue
in a private and individual sense. Industry and frugality
were the foremost virtues. In this way liberalism exalted
individual commercial activity as evidence of these
virtues. 6
in Bicentennial Perspective ," William and Marv Ouarterlv 46
(April 1989) , 341-375. This list is by no means exhaustive
but only suggestive on some recent scholarship on
interpretations of the founding period.
6 Clearly I reject the arguments of the republican
revisionists who argue that classical thought most heavily
influenced the founding generation. On the role of
classical thought see Wood , especially 46-123; J.G.A.
Pocock , The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political
Thouaht and the Atlantic Reoublican Tradition (Princeton:
Princeton University press , 1975) and , with Terence Ball ,
Conceptual Chanae and the Constitution (Lawrence , Kansas:
University Press of Kansas , 1988); Bernard Bailyn , 및뇨르
Ideoloaical Oriains of the American Revolution (Cambridge ,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press , 1967); Robert E.
Shalhope , "Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of
an Understanding of Republicanism in American
Historiography ," Willi~m_and Marv Ouarterlv , 29 (January
1972) , 49-80. The dominating influence of Locke on the
founders was widely accepted until the emergence of the
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It would be wrong to characterize Americans of the
1770s and 1780s as being in a Lockean state of nature.
There were established communities: towns , counties , and
states. There was also a commonality in the acceptance of
institutions such as representative government and private
property. But the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution provided examples of the construction of a new ,
national community. Both documents explicitly recognized
and celebrated the American people as the only legitimate
source of power to make a government.
Yet it would also be wrong to discount the sense
Americans had of being relatively close to a state of
nature. They were not savages , to be sure. But they
perceived the land they inhabited as untamed; the
hinterlands seemed to be in a state of nature promising rich
revisionist school in the 1960s. For examples see Carl
Becker , The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the
HistorY of Political Ideas (New York: Random House , 1922 ,
repro 1942) and Louis Hartz , The Liberal Tradition in
America (New York: Harcourt , Brace , 1955). Locke and
liberalism have been resurrected recently. Thomas L. Pangle
in his The Soirit of Modern Reoublicanism: The Moral Vision
of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press , 1988)
sees his task as "reanimating" the role Locke ’ s philosophy
played in the thinking of the founders (p. 3). More
accessible works are Joyce Appleby , Capitalism and a New
Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York
and Loudon: New York University Press , 1984) and Isaac
Kramnick , R르publicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism: Political
IdeoloQV_ in Late Eiqhteenth-Century Enqland and America
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press , 1990). Both
emphasize the role that commercial relations played in
American thought. I follow Kramnick most closely in this
chapter.
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rewards to those who could master it. Citizens experienced
an equality unrivaled in the world. They had always had a
hand in governing themselves.
In declaring their independence from England Americans
made clear that sovereignty was a natural function of the
people. When "one people" decided to change the way in
which they were governed they were justified by "the Laws of
Nature and Nature ’ s God." According to the Lockean contract
theory , men in a state of nature gave up a portion of their
natural rights in order to be more secure. They could thus
pursue their own chosen aims without many of the
uncertainties and fears inherent in an anarchic state of
nature. According to the revolutionary Declaration of
Independence government had to derive its "just Powers from
the consent of the governed." The people could change their
government at any time to that form which "shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." This
suggested that men did not need to be in a state of nature
to exercise their natural rights. They retained the
authority to change or abolish government notwithstanding
the establishment of government. 7
The Constitution , its ratification , and the government
it created were a masterstroke in representational politics.
7 The language of the Declaration of Independence
clearly conceives of a social contract legitimated by the
natural rights of its parties. Kramnick finds that "Locke
lurks behind its every phrase" (293).
23
American nationalists boldly ignored the st~tes (i.e. the
existing communities and governments) and invited the People
to "ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
States of A.illerica." Popular sovereignty was the supreme
source of power in the American nation and the source of the
nation itself. Proponents of the Constitution circumvented
the state legislatures and held popular ratifying
conventions. In this way the people approved in a
straightforward , unmistakable manner of their government.
They made their constitutions and they could unmake them.
Thus all parts of the government represented the people.
There had always been a distinction between the governed and
the government. Now the distinction was blurred. The
governed had made the government. 8
Popular sovereignty , as understood in England , defined
the people as composed of two bodies: the legislative power
8 My contention here is controversial; many scholars
view the Constitution as undemocratic (as did many of the
document ’ s contemporary opponents.) Charles A. Beard , ~묘
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the united
St르프르흐 (New York: Free Press , London: Collier
Macmillan ,1935) , is the seminal work in this regard. More
recently Gordon S. Wood has discussed the democratic
character of the Constitution in "Democracy and the
Constitution ," Robert Goldwin and William Shambra , eds. 전으표
Democratic is the Constitution? (Washington , D.C.: A. E.
P. , 1980) , 1-17. I rely on Wood for his argument that the
proponents of the Constitution were successful in convincing
(at least some) people that the mixed government of the
Constitution was representative and thus "democratic." I g。
beyond Wood , however , in suggesting that the radical method
。f ratifying the Constitution -- the popular ratifying
conventions -- gave Americans , up to the Civil War , a direct
connection with the creation of the nation ’ s government.
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which they exercised through an elected representative
system and the constituent power which had been exercised ,
p~esumably in a similar fashion , in the hazy past.
Americans , in creating their national government ,
transformed "the people" in a revolutionary way. Here , the
people were endowed with sovereignty by God (or Nature). And
like God , (to paraphrase Edmund Morgan) they were
。mnipresent， for in themselves they constituted the "body
politic" over which they ruled. The constituent and
legislative powers were joined in the body politic. These
powers were exercised by the "body natural" of the people
(again borrowing from Morgan). It had been real , living ,
identifiable people who had consented to the constitutional
contract. 9 The people ’ s sovereignty in America was both
the theoretical power that gave legitimacy to governmental
authority and physical power which could be exercised by a
crowd ... or a mob.
But the Constitution , though created by popular
sovereignty , institutionalized only legislative sovereignty ,
not constituent sovereignty. It provided mechanisms for
creating laws and amending itself , but did not establish any
procedure to change the form of government. Under the
Constitution the people could not exercise constituent
sovereignty (so long as the government resisted) without
violence. Beyond the preamble the only hint of popular
9 Morgan , 78-93 , the quote is from 17.
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constituent sovereignty in the Constitution was the vague
"guarantee" in Article IV , that each state would have a
"Republican Form of Government." What a "Republican Form of
Government" might be was not described. The enforcement of
this guarantee was defined as a function of the federal
government , not the people. The Constitution ’ s silence
regarding constituent sovereignty thus highlighted the
problem of creating stable governments , a problem basic t。
popular sovereignty. • o To wit , how could the people retain
the constituent power and yet have confidence in the
longevity of government?
If the Constitution was silent on the matter of the
constituent power , Americans had the Declaration of
Independence to provide a basis for , and serve as an emblem
of , their sovereignty. It was the exercise of this power
that explained why there was a united States of America.
And they had very concrete examples of the exercise of the
constituent power. They watched it in the establishment of
state constitutions. In England the tension inherent in
governments based on popular sovereignty -- that between the
governing laws and the sovereign people -- remained
submerged as the people could not and had not presented
themselves in their "body natural" to create government. In
10 The Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island and the case of
Luther v. Borden which arose from it , illustrated this
problem of popular sovereignty. See Dennison , 3-8 , 141-192 ,
and especially 195-205.
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America the tension was palpable. It was people , not laws ,
that created new governments as Americans tamed a wild
continent. As Americans settled new lands and set up new
governments they exercised their natural rights in subduing
nature. In San Francisco in 1851 the men who joined
together in the Committee of Vigilance understood themselves
in light of this heritage of popular sovereignty.
LABOR , EQUALITY , AND MAJORITARIANISM IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA
Although San Francisco ’ s vigilantes referred back t。
their nation ’ s revolutionary heritage , the heritage to which
they referred was one that had been re-shaped in dramatic
ways before 1850 -- the period generally referred to as the
"Age of Jackson." Americans ’ view of themselves was
modified during the antebellum years of the nineteenth
century. The market revolution and the development of
increasingly democratic political beliefs combined to form a
confident middle class. The values of the middle class were
particularly well adapted to the powerful forces of the
market. Between the end of the War of 1812 and 1850 , the
American culture based on land gave way to a culture based
more on the market. Participation in the impersonal market
eroded social barriers and reinforced a sense of equality
- among white men , at least. Equality; combined with the
era ’ s mass politics , seemed in some ways to fulfill the
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promise of popular sovereignty , that all would have a hand
in government.끼
After the discovery of gold along California ’ s American
River in 1848 , the Americans who went there in search of a
fortune carried with them the precepts and ideals that they
inherited from the ideologically crucial Jacksonian era
(1828-1836) and the dozen or so years that followed during
which these assumptions became firmly embedded in American
political culture. In these years the notions of labor and
production were extended far beyond the agricultural
constraints of eighteenth century America. A middle class
consciousness enshrined commerce and the pursuit of
wealth. 12 Those who fell outside of the accepted mores
11 "Land and Market ," the first chapter of Charles
Sellers , The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America , 1815-
후흐오흐 (New York and Oxford: The Oxford University Press ,
1991) , 3-33 , is a first-rate summary of the change America
had experienced by 1815. Steven Watts extends this period a
bit to 1820 in The Reoublic Reborn: War and the Makino of
Liberal America , 1790-1820 (Baltimore and London: The Johns
Hopkins University Press , 1987). For Watts this change
"involved the consolidation of a market economy and society ,
a liberal political structure and ideology , and a bourgeois
culture of self-controlled individuals" (xvii). Joyce
Appleby finds the influences of the Atlantic trade and
commercial agriculture of the eighteenth century as having
inclined Americans toward a market-style culture before
1800. Gary B. Nash , in The Urban Crucible: Social Chanqe ,
Political Consciousness , and the Orioins of the American
Revolution (Cambridge , Massachusetts and London: Harvard
University Press , 1979) , finds this change to a "commercial
economy •.. competitive social order ... and contentious
civic life" beginning even earlier , in America ’ s colonial
cities (vii).
12 Richard Hofstadter ’ s "Andrew Jackson and the Rise
。f Liberal Capitalism," in his The American Political
Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York: Alfred A.
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were seen as a threat to the security of the community.
The shift of the Jackson years is evident in the way in
which the conception of citizenry changed between 1800 and
1850. The United States of America was based on the
proposition of government by the governed. During the early
years of the republic , there were widely accepted notions
about what type of men were best suited to self-government.
The virtues of disinterestedness and independence were
thought to be indispensable. For the republic to survive ,
citizens would have to actively take part in their
communities. The best men should be selected to run the
machine of government. 13
The model citizen was the yeoman farmer. He depended
on no one but himself for his livelihood. His ownership of
land made his independence unassailable. The experience of
Americans during the early national period from independence
Knopf , 1948) , 44-66 , is indispensable to a study of this
period. His entrepreneurial "Jacksonian Man" deservedly
remains a stock character in the era ’ s history. Arthur M.
Schlesinger , Jr. provides a counterpoint to Hofstadter in
The Aae of Jackson (Boston: Little , Brown and Company ,
1945). Schlesinger viewed the Jacksonians as the champions
。f the laboring man. Marvin Meyers in The Jacksonian
Persuasion: Politics and Belief (Stanford , California:
Stanford University Press , 1957) found the Jacksonians full
。f paradox , advancing the changes and progress of a free
market society while longing for the simple virtues that
were thought to be rooted in the early republic.
13 See Gordon S. Wood , "Interests and
Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution ,"
Richard Beeman , Stephen Botein , and Edward C. Carter , eds. ,
Bevond Confederation: Oriains of the Constitution and
Americεn National Identitv (Chapel Hill , North Carolina:
University of North Carolina Press , 1987); 69-109.
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to about 1800 , lent much credibility to this ideal. Land
ownership was widespread. There was an unprecedented
equality in condition and opportunity -- among whites at
least. This made it easy for many Americans to believe that
they and their country could remain aloof from the intrigues
and war of Europe. Indeed , with the slowness of
communication it was easy to feel isolated , even from one ’ s
neighbors.
But the ideal was not reality. Not everyone owned
property , and this made many property owners wary of the
propertyless. Despite the remarkable equality , there were
wide disparities in wealth and opportunity. Regardless of
the sense of isolation , Americans did not live in a vacuum.
Nor , it seems , did they want to do so.
Eastern merchants were concerned with shipping and
credit. These were necessarily tangled in European affairs.
Backcountry farmers in western Pennsylvania worried about
continued access down the Mississippi River , controlled
alternately by France and Spain and coveted by Britain.
The states also had to contend with each other. In time , the
Articles of Confederation were discarded in favor of the
Constitution , which was more congenial to commerce. There
were ongoing sectional disputes. Americans would have to
contend with the world and each other.
The United States withstood many serious threats to its
existence and emerged after the first quarter of the
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nineteenth century as a secure nation. It had immensely
expanded its frontiers , primarily through the Louisiana
Purchase. It had survived the War of 1812 with Britain. The
war , often called the second war for American independence ,
provided Americans with a psychological boost. The end of
the war , and especially Andrew Jackson ’ s stunning victory at
New Orleans , turned a divisive and unpopular war into a
gal、ranizing experience. It made the United States feel more
like a nation.μ
Before the war the United States had largely been
concerned with preserving its experiment in republican
government from internal and external threats. The end of
the war in 1815 saw the end of the Napoleonic Wars in
Europe. This stabilized the international situation and
minimized external threats to the country and its
republicanism. Americans were able to concentrate on
activities at horne. While they remained concerned about
internal threats to republicanism , ~~erican confidence
regarding their form of government increased. Republicanism
was no longer an experiment but a proven form of
government. 15
Americans were confirming for themselves , if not the
world , that their system was superior to all others. They
14 On the War of 1812 and its relation to the rise of
a market society see Watts , 276-321.
15 Ibid. , 283-284 , 287.
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found unimpeachable evidence in the unprecedented growth of
their young nation. They flowed into the area of the
Louisiana Purchase and soon moved beyond it. This
geographic expansion coincided with the larger developments
。f modern nationalism and the international market economy.
The context in which Americans experienced these
developments was one that exalted the values of liberty and ,
increasingly , equality. To Americans it was obvious that
self-government , improvement , and progress were bound
together. They found ready outlets for their national pride
and economic desires in the developments of nationalism and
capitalism.
The vast natural resources and a rapidly growing
population were superbly adapted by the nation ’ s culture and
political system to the market revolution. The nation's
success seemed to stern from its alignment with the natural
。rder of things. Even with periodic and sometimes severe
economic downturns , the economy surged ahead. Americans
experienced not slow and steady improvement , but an
explosion. 16 They considered their country an archetype
。f political perfection. To its faithful , the American
system was viewed as bringing about a secular millennium of
prosperity and political freedom. 1?
Americans ’ 。ptimism was reflected in their culture. To
16
1?
Sellers , 22-23 , 132 , 343-345 , 391-392.
I am borrowing from Sellers , 301.
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be American was to expect freedom and progress as a
birthright. But this progress forced Americans to rethink
how they fit into the community and to adapt to a rapidly
changing world. Setbacks or even a lack of advancement were
magnified by this fundamental expectation of progress.
The post-war era witnessed an international market
largely unimpeded by Eu r.opean conflict. The United States ,
with its vast tracts of agricultural land , continued t。
expand its output of produce. The international market for
cotton typified a market pressure that was changing
agriculture. This was the pressure for specialization in
commercial crops. The widening economy allowed and often
encouraged the production of a single crop for trade rather
than the cultivation of a variety of crops for subsistence.
The urbanization that took place also encouraged
specialization by providing domestic markets for produce.
The role of the farmer in America was beginning , albeit
slowly , to change from the independent and isolated yeoman
to the interdependent participant in a market economy. He
was taking on some of the characteristics of the wage
18earner.
A similar change was taking place in the cities. The
system of independent masters as the nation ’ s producers of
non-agricultural products was also affected by the
18 Harry L. Watson , Libertv and Power: The Politics of
Jacksonian America (New York: Hill and Wang , 1990) , 19-20 ,
2 。
‘J •
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increasing pervasiveness of the market economy. The pattern
。f progression from apprentice to journeyman to master had
been part of the social fabric of the city. The master
artisan was like the yeoman farmer: possessed of skills ,
tools , and shop , he was an independent and esteemed member
。f the comnunity. They were respected and acted as leaders
in urban politics. Their place was elevated above that of
the journeyman and apprentice as was the freeholder ’ s above
the propertyless. Access to more and larger markets changed
this social order. 19
The increasing division of labor in the urban work
force changed expectations but also created new
opportunities. Instead of the single track of apprentice t。
journeyman to master , the new increasingly market-driven
economy needed other roles to be filled. Industries needed
foremen , bookkeepers , clerks , superintendents , engineers ,
and πanagers， and the services of lawyers , doctors ,
ministers , and teachers. Harry Watson has noted that these
new career opportunities created by urban growth "laid the
basis of a solid middle class." This solid middle class ,
well-adapted to the market culture , increasingly fixed the
standards by which members of society were measured. 20
The nature of the American experience had irretrievably
changed. People who in the past had been isolated from one
19
20
Ibid. , 29-31; Sellers , 24-25.
Watson , 31-32 , 178-179; Sellers , 237.
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another were now linked by newspapers , roads , market
relations , and , increasingly , by a new similarity of
condition: wage labor. What had been an insulated ,
evenly-paced society was becoming faster-paced and
interdependent. Technological and market changes combined
with foreign and internal immigration to produce a shifting
experience for Americans. The ideas and conditions produced
by the vicissitudes of American society were widely reported
in the popular press , thus providing a connection among a
diverse citizenry.
The market revolution drastically changed the world in
which Americans lived. Its various manifestations combined
to form a new order. The accelerating pace of
industrialization demanded cotton for mills and other
products and the population became increasingly urbanized.
The transportation revolution was instrumental in making
markets accessible. Both industry and commercial
agriculture relied on innovations in transportation t。
profitably reach their markets. Roads , canals , steamboats ,
and later railroads shrank the distance between producer and
market. 21
The changes in transportation also changed the nature
of communications. The number of post offices increased and
rates went down. Steamboats and railroads operated on
~ George Rogers Taylor , The Transportation
Revolution , 1815-1860 (New York: Rinehart , 1951); Watson ,
24-28; Sellers , 41-44.
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increasingly reliable schedules. The telegraph sped
messages across long distances. The invention of the rotary
steam press in 1830 , along with these improvements in
transportation , gave rise to the inexpensive ,
mass-circulation newspaper. This made communication with
distant markets more regular and business-like. Such
interaction , through letters , newspapers , and πagazines，
became a feature of daily life. The American Tract Society
and the American Temperance Society spread middle class
values effectively with the help of cheap printing. America
was becoming a mass market with a mass culture due to the
increasing ease of communication. 22
Americans were changing from independent yeomen and
craftsmen to interdependent economic actors. They made
decisions in light of market forces , mainly profit.
Improvements in transportation and communication allowed
them to take part in this larger market.
These larger and more profitable markets engendered a
larger scale of production. In a small market the
handcrafts of the master artisan ably filled the local
community ’ s needs. But with access to mass markets the
production of large amounts of identical products became a
profitable possibility. The capitalist could anticipate
these markets and produce large amounts of a product (with
the corresponding benefits of economies of scale) with the
22 Watson , 26-27 , 89 , 223; Sellers , 263-264 , 370-372.
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employment of piece-workers or wage laborers. The master ,
without sufficient capital , could not compete. Accordingly
more workers were employed as wage laborers by the
increasingly successful capitalists. Under the old system
the apprentice hoped to rise to become his own master.
Under the wage system the worker had only dim hopes of
becoming a capitalist. But the proportional increase in
wage earners helped incubate new ideas about political and
social equality; an equality that did not depend on land
。wnership but was inherent in men. 23
Changes in the way people earned a living significantly
affected political relations. The American body politic had
been made up of men who were equal because of the shared
condition of property ownership. Though property ownership
remained prevalent , the portion of those without property or
with little hope of owning property (or the means of
production as masters) , especially in the cities , had
increased. This caused a rethinking of how equality was
achieved. This was part of what Charles Sellers has
identified as a change from a culture of land to a market
culture. 24 One result of the changing attitude toward land
was the political empowerment of propertyless wage laborers.
23 Essential to study of urban labor in America is
Sean Wilentz , Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise
。f the American Workina Class , 1788-1850 (New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press , 1984). On the master-
journeyman-apprentice system see 23-60; Watson , 29-31.
24 Sellers , 6.
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This empowerment was essential to the ascendance of mass
politics.
The change in the perception of equality was part of
the development of an American self-image , particularly
among the faithful of the Democratic Party. As America's
future no longer seemed in doubt , the sense of the
republican "experiment" gave way to a sense of
accomplishment. Economic , geographic , and population
growth , coupled with unrivaled personal freedom ,
demonstrated to Americans the indisputable correctness of
their form of popular government. Democracy came to be
equated with progress. When combined with an increasing
sense of nationalism , it produced a new image of the
patriotic American. Though the freeholder remained at the
pinnacle of the American pantheon , there was an increasing
sense that the rights of man were separate from , and
superior to , the rights of property. This had profound
implications for American politics , as Watson explains: "If
。ne white man was as good as another , then simple majority
rule would be a safer source of virtue and a more reliable
guide to the cornmon good than the paternal benevolence of a
few well-trained and high-minded gentlemen."~ Political
power was becoming more accessible.
In the antebellum era many states recognized the
benefits of tying landless laborers to the government by
25 Watson , 49-52 , quote is from 51.
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offering them the vote. Residency , rather than property
。wnership， increasingly became the standard which determined
the eligibility to vote. For example , the continued
elevation of property over natural equality was questioned
by the landless citjzens of Richmond, Virginia in a petition
in 1829: "Attachment to property , often a sordid sentiment ,
is not to be confounded with the sacred flame of
patriotism. ,, 26
It is not surprising that Americans moved away from
property ownership as a measure of equality. The American
tradition comprehended the ideals of virtue ,
disinterestedness , and independence. An industrious but
landless laborer could be virtuous and disinterested , if not
as independent as a yeoman. The labor ζheory of γalue --
the principle that all wealth is produced by labor -- gained
credence in antebellum America among a broad portion of the
population. This wide spectrum of support was due to the
varying definitions which labor could encompass. 27
As land ownership began to be less important as a
measure of political rights , the definition of citizen (or
patriot) was changing. It was loyalty to the national
culture and a consciousness of being part of that culture
that defined a citizen or an "American." It was becoming
less his independence and separation from his fellows (like
26 Ibid. , 50.
v Wilentz , 157-158.
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the hardy yeoman) , but his status as a productive and
dedicated part of the nation that demonstrated his
citizenship.28
The traditional view of a political elite of wealth
(property ownership) , talent , and intellect assumed the
existence of political inequality. The stake-in-society
theory assumed that as a primary function of government was
to provide security for property , that only those who owned
real property had a "stake" or interest in the maintenance
。f society. Thus property owners were the only safe
repository for political power; the propertyless would only
use it to seize others ’ property. This theory circumscribed
popular sovereignty by limiting its extension to those wh。
met an artificial standard of property ownership. Men might
be naturally equal , but society was not a natural state.
The apportionment of political power , it was thought , should
take into account the acquired differences among men.
However , the operation and success of American society
with its representative government and relative equality of
conditions eroded political traditions. Ashworth asserts
that "Orthodox Democrats invariably rejected the traditional
stake-in-society theory upon which so much of American
~ John Ashworth , ’ Aararians and Aristocrats ’ : Partv
Ideolo디;" in ‘ the United States , 1837-1846 (Atlantic
Highlands , New Jersey: Humanities Press Inc.; London: Royal
Historical Society , 1983) , 12.
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republicanism had been based."~ If the stake-in-society
theory was discarded , it meant that distribution of
political power would corne to ~eflect men's natural
equality; sovereignty would be more widely and evenly
distributed. The changes in American economic life wrought
by the market revolution had helped change political ideas
about equality.
Democrats transformed the stake-in-society theory.
They elevated the rights of man to a place separate from and
superior to the rights of property. Liberty and equality
were functions of a natural process , not of the artifice of
property ownership. Men were capable of self-government
because they were men , not because they owned property.
Men's liberty and equality and their desire to preserve them
gave them a stake in society. This new and broader
conception of equality signified a wider and more popular
base for sovereign authority.E
Property own~rship remained an important part of the
American ideal , however. Americans either owned , or hoped
to own , property. The Democrats lionized the ideal of the
yeoman farmer. But their belief in political equality
undermined their rhetoric of the agrarian hero. If lack of
property did not exclude one from the realm of politics ,
then it would be increasingly difficult to isolate the
29
30
Ibid.
Ibid. , 23-28.
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property-owning farmer as the repository of the nation ’ s
virtue .31
More and more it would be a man ’ s labor and not the
type of labor that would make him respectable and give him a
claim to political equality. Ashworth cites the
"commendable qualities" such as "steadiness , simplicity ,
frugality , sternness , and endurance" that were the hallmarks
。f all productive labor. Labor was the moral basis of the
economy.32 Those who had and utilized these "commendable
qualities ," it was believed , were rewarded with material
success. If economic opportunity was open to all , this
implied that political and social authority were similarly
available. 33
By the 1830s Americans no longer thought of their
country as a republican experiment in self-government , but
as a sYmbol of its triumph. As self-government proved t。
Americans that it was the best form of government , they
increasin~:y viewed its success as a natural phenomenon.
Its efficacy stemmed from the natural order , not from
man-made systems. Thus it was logical to do away with a
man-made custom (property ownership qualifications) and
revert to a natural principle of equality among men. 34
31 Ibid. , 22-25.
32 Ibid. , 23.
33 Sellers , 27-33.
34 Ibid. , 70.
42
The Jacksonian Democrats embraced the ideals of
equality and the fundamental goodness of self-government.
They believed that democracy developed the moral and
physical resources of Americans. All the nation ’ s triumphs
reflected on democracy. Democracy and nationalism were
united in the Democratic mind. It had been the achievement
。f Americans to overturn and prove wrong the political
theories of the rest of the world. The incredibly rapid
development of the United States was positive proof of the
virtue of the democratic system. 35
Democracy and progress became an identity. Progress
flowed naturally from obedience to the natural law of
self-government. George Bancroft enunciated this principle
when he wrote: "truth is a social spirit; her home is in the
heart of the people ... [by giving] power to the whole
people ... you gain the nearest expression of the law of
God , the voice of conscience , the oracle of universal
reason. ,, 36 Americans were stripping away the man-made
limitations to the extension of political authority t。
reveal a political order based on unrefined principles.
Paradoxically , as their society matured , Americans ’
conception of political organization was rn。、ring back toward
a state of nature.
In theory , the physical isolation of the yeoman had
35
36
Ibid. , Ashworth , 7-9.
Quoted in Ashworth , 10.
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forced him to be self-reliant; he had to work in order t。
survive. Dependent only on himself his virtue and
independence were assured. But urban laborers also depended
。n their own labor for survival. That they did not own the
means of production as the yeoman did became only
incidental. The yeoman might continue to be idealized , but
every laborer could lay claim to the same commendable
qualities that were produced by the sweat of one ’ s brow ,
whether on the farm or in the shop. In the largely rural
society of antebellum America , it would have been surprising
if the farmer was not the sYmbol of equality and virtue.
More and more , however , platitudes about virtue were
directed at labor , significantly so.
Many Democrats believed in a labor theory of value.
Wealth was produced by labor. Liberty was a function of the
ability to enjoy the rewards of one's labor. Individuals or
minorities that could appropriate the rewards of others ’
labor would have power over the others. With such power the
few could destroy others ’ liberty and social equality along
with it. Liberty , equality , and power were , then , rooted in
labor. The ability to labor was universal , and thus thi십
avenue to liberty , equality , and power was open to all.
Ashworth found the consequences of this to be momentous for
American politics: lO A political system that was explicitly
and avowedly based upon the qualities common to all men --
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this was the levelling thrust of Jacksonian Democracy."~
Democrats sought to have power distributed amongst the
individual members of society. Men felt the effects of
government equally and thus should share equally in it.
Democracy was then a vehicle for the expression of the
public will. The link between the holders of power
(individuals) and the employment of that power (government)
should be a direct relationship. There should be n。
intervention by an elite , natural or otherwise , between the
public will and government action. For most of the Founders
such an unmediated process had been frightening because it
failed to restrain that antithesis of virtue: self-interest.
Democrats , however , recognized and accepted the role of
self-interest in society.?3
The desire for wealth and power were universal
propensities. Even those with great integrity were not
considered immune to them. Ashworth argues that "the
Democratic view of man was essentially ambivalent and
dualistic , for while the ordinary man was naturally good and
virtuous he was also potentially greedy and grasping."~
Instead of attempting to subdue self-interest , Democrats
capitalized on it to strengthen democracy.
Jacksonians thought self-interest to be dangerous only
37
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when it was exercised by an individual or a minority. In
these cases self-interest would work against the community ’ s
interest. But should the combined self-interest of the
majority be aroused , it would benefit the community. To the
Democratic mind , majorities could not subsist on minorities
and their struggle against minorities that grasped for
wealth or power was only defensive. History was believed t。
have shown that the majority , the masses , had always
struggled against the powerful few to protect their liberty
。r property.40 Andrew Jackson , for example , maintained
"never for a moment believe that the great body of the
citizens ... can deliberately intend to do wrong."이
The Founders had articulated assumptions about the
people ’ s right to assent to and participate in government.
However , they felt that a careful selection process was
necessary to the success of republican government. This was
evidenced by their reliance on the selection of senators by
state legislatures and the president by the electoral
college. It was also reflected in the power given to the
national government , which presumably would be less subject
to the vagaries of direct democracy. To the contrary , a
generation later the Jacksonians took self-government much
more literally.
The aggrandizement of the common man and the sanction
40
41
Ibid. , 18-20.
Quoted in Watson , 10.
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。f mass politics in the 1830s and 1840s , had the effect of
validating the undistinguished. Alexis de Tocqueville's
well-known remark about the "equality of conditions" seemed
to refer to the passable condition of most Americans.
Tocqueville found that a "middling standard" prevailed in
everything in America. 42 The "middling standard"
intellectually simplified political equality. There was
dignity in being ordinary.
Men were thus encouraged to conform. Ironically this
increased their sense of self-importance. There was a
symbiotic relationship between individualism and the faith
in the majority. Equal individuals were necessary t。
legitimize majority rule. Majority rule gave even the most
insignificant man , in the abstract and sometimes the real
sense , power equal to other men. The broadening of
political power through universal manhood suffrage and the
equality that accompanied this extension of political power
loosened the restraint that deferential politics had
enforced. 43 As more men participated on increasingly equal
terms in the political process , there was a more direct
connection between majority rule and the exercise of
government authority.
The equality of the market-oriented economy rewarded
42 Quoted in Ibid. , 33.
43 On deference in early American politics see Morgan ,
169-173 , 286 , 292 , 300-301; Nash , 98-100 , 129 , 200-201.
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commercial self-interest. Grit , determination , and
persistence , abilities accessible to all , were valued over
talent. "Above all ," Watson concludes , lithe Jacksonians ’
celebration of the rights of the common man had encouraged
the belief that individual self-improvement was the supreme
goal of American society. ,, 44
Richard Hofstadter , in his well known essay on
antebellum American politics , identified as central the
’'Jacksonian man" who was characterized by his adaptation t。
the new market economy. In the antebellum period the
"typical American ," for Hofstadter , "was an expectant
capitalist , a hardworking , ambitious person for whom
enterprise was a kind of religion , and everywhere he found
conditions that encouraged him to extend himself. “ 5
Edward Pessen offered a more prosaic evaluation of
Americans: "Materialism and a love of money were perhaps
their most noticeable traits. ’ l 뼈 Both Hofstadter and
Pessen are on target; upward mobility was the great motive
。f antebellum America. And nowhere in antebellum America
were the prospects for rapid advancement as dramatic , and
real , as in the rich placers of California.
With everyone (who was white and male , at least)
44 Ibid. , 252.
~ Hofstadter , 55-56.
~ Edward Pessen , Jacksonian America: Society ,
Personality , and Politics (Homewood , Illinois: The Dorsey
Press , 1969) , 349.
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possessing liberty and equality , there was a great deal of
pressure on individuals to succeed. The freedom and
。pportunity that was widely available in the United States ,
at least as an ideal , lent a sense of urgency to getting
ahead. The tremendous amount of internal immigration
testified to Americans penchant for seeking new
。pportunities. Americans still idealized the producer
ethic , but the bustling pace , especially in urban areas ,
made slow , steady improvement seem like no improvement at
all. Upward mobility was not just a possibility , but an
imperative. In 1836 Francis J. Grund , an immigrant ,
captured this American disposition when he compared the
country to a "gigantic workshop" with a warning over the
entrance , "No admission here , except on business. "47
This striving for material gain impressed foreign
visitors to the United States. They were struck by the
bustle and movement in America. Francis Lieber , for
example , thought that "an American distinguishes himself
by a restlessness , a striving and driving onward. [He] wants
to perform within a year what others do within a much longer
period. "48
The economic and political changes effectively altered
the way individuals perceived themselves. Political
equality and economic opportunity combined with the notion
~ Quoted in Hofstadter , 56.
48 Quoted in Pessen , 22.
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。f self-improvement to exalt aspirations for upward mobility
。ver the steady and isolated existence of the agrarian
producer.
The allure of the success ethic and its rewards
supplanted the deprivation of the producer ethic. The
producer ethic's hardy yeoman remained a respectable staple
for political rhetoric , but for many Americans he was n。
longer a model to be emulated. He did not make enough
money. Honest hard work endured as something to be admired.
But an instinct for opportunity carne to be respected as
well.
Americans have demonstrated a remarkable ability t。
reconcile the apparent contradiction between a belief in
majority rule and the actuality of government by the few.
This inconsistency has strained the ideology of popular
sovereignty. This strain has been accommodated , however , in
two ways. First , by concei、ring of common interests between
governors and the governed. Second , by the recognition
(sometimes in words only) on the part of the governor that
ultimate authority is conferred by the governed. In this
way Americans have accepted an ambivalence between the
exercise of government authority by the few and the social
authority of the majority.
In antebellum America these tensions between a faith in
majoritarianism and in a ruling class selected on the basis
。 f merit were revealed in San Francisco. On one hand , it
50
was believed that the social and political course of a
community should be determined by the majority of its
citizens. On the other , it was accepted that some men were
more suited to positions of leadership and influence than
。thers. This was demonstrated by their personal qualities
(e.g. industry , moderate habits , talent) and usually
measured by their wealth. 49 These two sentiments were
accommodated through an implicit acknowledgement that
majoritarianism was best mediated in the practice of
governance by meritocracy.
The tensions between merit and equality have been more
。r less successfully subsumed into the American political
culture. Hofstadter has remarked on the "casual deference"
which the self-made man often received from his neighbors.
This allowed for the rapid development of political elites
in frontier areas whom Hofstadter called "one-generation
aristocrats."~ According to Hofstadter , the validation
these elites received at the polls strengthened their faith
in popular government. The "followers ," in turn , could be
confident in the leader acting as their advocate. Both the
leaders and the electorate could see the other as advancing
their common interests. A consensus was achieved.
49 For a cogent investigation into the belief in
superior leaders see Garry Wills , Cincinnatus: Georae
댄ashinaton and the Enliahtenment (Garden City , New York:
Doubleday and Company , 1984).
50 Hofstadter , 45 , 47.
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The "masses" and the "leadership ," while they
experienced conflict and appeared as distinct groups , were
dependent on each other. The "leadership" required the
validation of the "masses" for its programs and ideals and
needed its approval , at the polls , at least , to maintain
itself as the leading element of society. The "masses"
desired that the "leadership" champion its interests and
gained a sense of its own importance through its validation
。f the "leadership's" position and power.
These changes did not show themselves as perfectly
thought-out attitudes. Part of the reason for this
indistinctness was that two processes involved in the
change , economics and politics , were each championed by a
different political party. The Whigs and the Democrats
brought different visions of the reordering of society in
antebellum America. 51 Except for the most devoted of the
party faithful , individual Americans selected what they
liked from each vision to suit their own circumstances.
The Democrats advanced profound political changes ,
successfully making political equality part of the American
dogma , in the guise of a return to the principles of the
Founders. The Whigs embraced the new commercial order. A
51 See Ashworth , 7-84 , for a discussion of the two
parties. The Democrats have received the larger part of
attention from scholars but Daniel Walker Howe , 모뇨트
Political Culture of the American Whias (Chicago and London:
The University of Chicago Press , 1979) concentrates on the
Whig Party.
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meritocracy composed of men in a wide variety of
。ccupations， enterprising and thriving in a commercial
economy nurtured by government policies , was the ideal of
the Whigs. 52
The Democrats enshrined the agrarian producer ethic.
The Whigs cherished the idea of a ruling class of the
natural elite. But the division between the two was not
always clear-cut. Not all Democrats toiled behind their
plow and avoided speculation and commercial endeavor. The
Whigs enthusiastically adopted the Democrats ’ methods of
mass mobilization in their own electioneering. Meritocracy
and equality combined into a powerful dynamic that relegated
the producer ethic and the natural aristocracy to positions
。f secondary importance. The striving of men to get ahead
eclipsed the high-minded images of the hardy yeoman and the
worthy governor.~
Wealth and talent remained important assets to those
who aspired to political leadership. But the presumption of
privilege to positions of influence wilted under the
tramping of aggressive mass electioneering. Jacksonian
Democracy did not necessarily lift common men to positions
。f powe~. It did , however , have the effect of requiring
those who sought such positions to make themselves appealing
to the populace. Pessen puts it coarsely , maintaining that
52
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Jacksonian Democracy gave power not to the common man , "but
to the shrewd , ambitious , wealthy , and able politicians wh。
knew best how to flatter them."~
One result of the rise in mass politics was to convince
those who benefitted from it of the virtue of universal
suffrage. The extension of the vote seemed an outstanding
idea to those whom it elevated to office and thereby
procured heretofore unattainable political spoils.
Hofstadter found it developed in these new leaders a "faith
in the wisdom and justice of popular decisions."ss If the
common man did not ascend to political office , his vote was
valued by those who he helped elect. Equality became an
enduring principle partly because of its utility t。
political aspirants and its emp。‘~erment of the many.
The shift from a property-based political elite to a
more widely-based electorate was a result of the economic
changes of the market revolution and the progression of
American political society. Equality had taken its place
with liberty in the nation ’ s ideological hierarchy.
Equality was now the guardian of liberty. The
representative democracy of the Founders h건d become the
participatory democracy of Jackson.
54 Pessen , 347.
55 Hofstadter , 47.
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THE MARKET CULTURE AND SOCIAL CONTROL
Americans were struggling with tremendous changes in
the antebellum era. 56 Self-interest was more acceptable
than in the past. Yet the market economy , which was largely
responsible for this change , was paradoxically making
individuals more interdependent. If a man was t。
participate in the market to get ahead , he could not remain
isolated. The increasing attachments and connections
created by the market economy and facilitated by
improvements in communication and transportation , were
conducive to conformity. In America the ordinary , middle
class standard became the expected model of conduct. But
the ordinary man was also striving to get ahead and looking
for the "main chance" so he could be extraordinary.
Those who had held the positions of power in the
eighteenth century -- the masters and gentlemen landowners -
- gave way to a new (though often overlapping) elite.
Employers , capitalists , political bosses , and the profit
motive took their places in the new order of things. Even
when the old holder of power and the new were the same
the master become capitalist or employer , for instance
the relationship had changed. It was no longer a
56 For discussions of these changes see Ashworth , 21-
34; Watson , 17-41.
55
paternalistic relationship , but an economic one. 57
In his examination of the revivals of the Second Great
Awakening in Rochester , New York , Paul E. Johnson recognizes
the changed relations of the work place and in society
generally. The manufacturers he studied became involved in
a faith that preached individual free will. Christian men ,
。f all classes , were men insofar as they took responsibility
for their own behavior. Employers were no longer
accountable for their charges ’ behavior. "A nascent
industrial capitalism became attached to visions of a
perfect moral order based on individual freedom and
self-government , and old relations of dependence , servility ,
and mutuality were defined as sinful and left behind. ’.58
The view that virtue resided in control over one ’ s
labor , rather than the ownership of the means of production ,
also contributed to the change in relation between employer
and employee. The relationship became less and less
familial and more of a purely economic association. The
common man and the "masters" met only in the political or
economic marketplace.~
As the role of traditional authorities was changing ,
mass politics took hold. Technological improvements in
57 See Paul E. Johnson , A Shopkeeper ’ s Millennium:
Society and Revivals in Rochester , New York , 1815-1837 (New
York: Hill and Wang , 1978).
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printing and low postal rates for newspapers stimulated the
spread of party dogma. Money and prestige were still
powerful , but (nearly) every man had the power of his vote.
The traditional authorities gave up or lost their paternal
power. And while the common man lost some of the security
that had been inherent in the old master-worker
relationship , he gained some of the power that the master
had formerly had over him.
This meant new means of social control would have to be
employed. Production through wage labor required a more
regularized and regimented society , one in which individuals
(who had free will after all) should conform to middle class
expectations by showing up for work sober and on time and
carry themselves with middle class comportment. With large
numbers of people who seemed unwilling to do these things ,
institutions were developed and strengthened (e.g. asylums ,
public schools , and reformatories of all kinds) that would
enforce these standards. ro
The revivals of the 1820s and 1830s provided another
model for social control. Johnson argues that these
"revivals were a means of building order and a sense of
common purpose among sovereign , footloose , and money-hungry
ro Sellers , 363-365; On the new institutions of
social control see Christopher Lasch , "The Origins of the
Asylum ," in The World of Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf ,
1973).
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individualists. ,, 61 Importantly , they had characteristics
。f other forms of social control. The revivals , Johnson
notes , relied on "individual conversion and public example ,
and increasingly ... mass politics and outright coercion" t。
improve society and prepare it for the second coming. 62
The vigilantes in San Francisco used similar methods t。
impose social order twice during the 1850s.
Ronald G. Walters , in his study of antebellum reform
movements identifies their key characteristics:
"millennialism and irnrnediatism. ,, 63 Americans seemed t。
have an unshakable faith in continued and dramatic
improvement. A better world was always possible. Progress ,
after all , necessarily sprouted from democracy. But hope
for the future was not enough to sustain Americans , they
wanted results. Foreign visitors were impressed (not always
favorably) with the restless activity of Americans.
Americans felt determination was a greater virtue than
patience.
Americans were not , however , particularly willing t。
discard old values arbitrarily. There was a paradox between
the sweeping changes of the antebellum period and the fierce
loyalty to and reverence for the ideals of the founding
61
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period. There was a sense that the founding had been an
achievement of the highest (perfect) order. Accordingly ,
when Americans experienced something that they felt was not
right it created intense anxiety. It was a disruption of
their ideal society.
Walters finds this anxiety to be a common theme among a
collection of more or less unrelated movements. He compares
the reform movements of his study with antimasonry ,
nativism , mobs , and the pro-slavery crusade. He finds that
all were reacting to a sense that "old values were being
lost and something or someone was to blame. Whatever was at
fault had to be eliminated or controlled if America was t。
fulfill its destiny."~ The vigilantes in San Francisco
did not feel that old values had been lost , but that
familiar values had not taken root in their city. They
tried to eliminate what they perceived to be barriers to the
establishment of these values.
In antebellum America , urban riots were often a
response to changes or conditions perceived as unjust.
Though violent and deadly these riots usually had some
bounds of conduct. They were almost always directed at the
perceived source of injustice , and efforts were even made t。
prevent injury to innocent parties. Fires that were
intended to destroy a malefactor ’ s property might have to be
put out to protect adjacent property , for example. In other
64 Ibid. , 10.
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cases rioters chastised their fellows for stealing rather
than destroying property.M
The sense of limits to behavior during riots stemmed
from the place in culture that rioting assumed. The riot
was not a pointless rampage. It was a form of mass social
control. But neither was it a model of probity. David
Grimsted in his study of rioting in the Jacksonian era found
that the riots did not "readily fall into categories of
either ’ irrational ’ or ’ socially purposeful ’ behavior. "66
Rioters and others who used violence to enforce their
conception of justice were not rejecting society but rather
trying to modify it. They were usually sure of what they
were against , bankers , for example , so the target of their
anger was focused. But their hoped for outcome , such as
financial security (which seemed threatened by bankers) ,
tended to be complex and elusive. Thus the consequences of
such violence were apt to be inconclusive. Similarly , the
vigilantes in San Francisco saw public violence as a means
of modifying their society. The results of their violent
acts were also inconclusive.
Achievement of an outcome was a strong reason for
groups to organize , but another factor was also important.
It was the sense of belonging felt by those who joi갑ed
M See David Grimsted , I’Rioting in Its Jacksonian
Setting , " American Historical Review 77 (1972): 61-397.
66 Ibid. , 379.
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together for a purpose. This transcended whether the goal
was reached or not. The ongoing manifestations of the use
。f violence as social control -- the fire companies , urban
gangs , and vigilance committees -- survived not only because
。f a goal , but through the feeling of fraternity among their
members. In the absence of traditional sources of support
such as the family and church , these organizations took on a
prominent role in reassuring the individual of his place in
society. Mary P. Ryan found that associations of the 1830s
helped young men form a "new kind of social bond , one based
。n common interest , age , and status and nourishing , warm ,
democratic , mutually supportive emotional ties."~
On the frontier , where conventional institutions were
undeveloped and the population was transient , voluntary
associations were not just surrogate social supports , but a
method of social control. Don Harrison Doyle argues that
voluntary associations , such as political parties and
vigilance committees , "were designed to integrate and order
a transient community ... they enforced the values of social
discipline in their members." 68
Antebellum man was committed to his own impr。、Tement and
67 Mary P. Ryan , Cradle of the Middle Class: The
Familv in Oneida County , New York , 1790-1865 (Cambridge and
New York: Cambridge University Press , 1981) , 127-132 , quote
is from 129.
68 Don Harrison Doyle , The Social Order of a Frontier
Community: Jacksonville , Illinois , 1825-1870 (Urbana ,
Chicago , and London: University of Illinois Press , 1978) ,
11 , quote is from 16.
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upward mobility: his self-interest. Yet he longed for a
feeling of community. He was steeped in a political culture
that valued equality and endorsed majoritarian decision
making. Americans expected constant improvement in society
and employed various means to bring it about: mass politics ,
the pressure of self-appointed elites who expressed
themselves through reform movements , and violence. All
these social undertakings were informed by an American
impulse for popular action. California , with its fledgling
civic institutions , provided an extraordinary environment in
which men tested the limits of social action.
CHAPTER III
GOLD RUSH CALIFORNIA: CHAOS AND COMMUNITY
When fabulous finds of gold were confirmed (and later
exaggerated) in California it presented a magnificent
。pportunity to Americans for rapid and dramatic advancement.
It appeared to be a place where men had a relatively equal
。pportunity to apply labor to a task and become rich. It
was not the producer ethic that sent men to the gold fields ,
but the prospect of nearly instantaneous success.
California ’ s rich placers were seductive. J. S. Holliday
writes about the men for whom "the frugality of generations
gave way to a contagion of optimism and ambition ,
responsible family men found their jobs and prospects
unrewarding when set against all that California could
provide." ’1 The frustrations attendant to some Americans ’
。bsession to get ahead could be realized in short order.
California seemed to embody the authenticity of upward
mobility: Men really could get rich quickly. The economic
parity that California promised seemed to fulfill the
antebellum era's pledge of political and social equality.
1 J. S. Holliday , The World Rushed In: The California
Gold Rush Experience (New York: Simon and Schuster , 1981) ,
Holliday , 50.
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California also tested the political and cultural
developments of the antebellum era. In the older states
traditions and institutions cushioned the impact of equality
and mass politics. The mines and towns of California
experienced these phenomena without the benefit of an
existing order. And few of the men pouring into California
were concerned with building order. They wanted gold and
they wanted it quickly. Hofstadter ’ s Jacksonian man and
Pessen ’ s greedy materialist came in force to California. 2
It was not just Americans who came to California. Men
came from Europe , South America , Mexico , Australia , and
China. While Americans established their cultural hegemony ,
there was still a commonality among the gold seekers. T。
paraphrase Dorothy Johansen ’ s "Working Hypothesis for the
Study of Migrations": Migrants ~o a particular place are
similar because they are drawn to that place by similar
motivations. It is the "pull" of the place to which men
irrunigrate rather than the similarity of the place from which
they emigrate that gives distinctive character to new
communities. 3
The type of man who came to California had a desire to
move up in the world , and to do it quickly. He was immersed
in the American dualism of fierce individualism and
2 Supra , Chapter 2 , 47.
3 Dorothy Johansen , "A Working Hypothesis for the
Study of Migrations ," Pacific Historical Review 36 , no.1
(February 1967): 11-12.
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dedication to majoritarian politics. He enjoyed both the
feeling of unassisted achievement and that of joining his
fellows in a common effort. He accepted violence , coercion ,
and mass politics as acceptable means of community
enforcement of social control. He was clearly more
adventuresome than his neighbor who stayed horne. Although
gold seekers brought an American heritage with them , it was
the unique situation in California that would make its
society distinct from other parts of the country. The
opportunity embodied in California seemed to affirm that men
could be equipotent -- economically , socially , and
politically. It sustained Americans ’ propensity to seek a
natural order of things.
California was , of course , unprepared for the gold
rush. The Mexican-American War had only recently ended.
Traditional Spanish and Mexican forms of government mixed
with the American military government and often resulted in
ad hoc combinations. The Mexican office of alcalde might be
filled by election or appointed by the military governor or
both , resulting in confusion and disagreement. These same
alcaldes could be found presiding over American-style jury
trials , which remained unacknowledged by any existing legal
code. This uncertain situation was aggravated by a lack of
action from Congress , which was paralyzed by the growing
sectional crisis , in providing for a government for
65
California. 4
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo left the area in
governmental limbo. The Mexican forms and officers could
not rule and the military government (theoretically , at
least) was prohibited from operating in peacetime.
Californians of American heritage were demanding their own
civil government. In 1847 the California Star editorialized
about the lack of written law. The editor remarked that
"some contend that there are really no laws in force here ,
but the divine law, and the law of nature."s It was a
portent of things to come.
GOLD RUSH CALIFORNIA: THE SETTING
The first rumblings of gold finds in California reached
the United States in August of 1848. When President James
Polk confirmed the discovery of extensive gold finds in
California in his annual message on December 5 , the
excitement over gold took on a frantic character. Those
with means and inclination boarded ships bound for San
Francisco. Others planned for the long overland trek the
following spring. Joint stock companies sprang up allover
4 Mar.y Floyd Williams , Historv of the San Francisc。
Committee of Viailance of 1851 (Berkeley , California:
University of California Press , 1921 , reprint; New York: De
Capo Press , 1969) , 23-39 , 132-133.
5 Quoted in ibid. , 38.
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the world , offering those of more modest means an
opportunity to make the trip and those of less adventurous
spirit a chance to profit while remaining behind. Tens of
thousands dashed , as best they could , for California.
The deluge of people that went to California was
remarkable. Rodman Paul estimates that the population
increased from 14 ,000 in 1848 to nearly 100 ,000 by the end
。 f 1849. When California took its own census in the latter
part of 1852 it found some 223 , 000 residents. Nearly 700
vessels had entered San Francisc。’ s harbor by the end of
1849. Many crewmen deserted. This phenomenal growth did
not give time for institutions to grow gradually.6
Whether an Argonaut chose the debilitating sea voyage
or the severe overland trek , the journey itself became a
part of his identity and in some way tied him to his fellow
gold seekers. It also ensured , in the words of Paul , that
he would arrive "exhausted in mind and depleted in
pocketbook."? As such it was part of the leveling
experience of California.
Important to the aura of equality in California was the
function of land. Except along the wharves it was of
marginal value. In the mining regions it was impossible t。
6 Rodman Paul , California Gold: The Beoinnino of
Minino in the Far West (Lincoln , Nebraska: University of
Nebraska Press , 1947) , 25; Holliday , 297; Carey McWilliams ,
California: The Great Exception (New York: Cur r.ent Books ,
1949) , 49.
7 Paul , 34.
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secure title to a piece of land. The land was ostensibly
。wned by the United States government which had not
promulgated any laws for its transfer to citizens. Mining
claims were administered locally under various systems of
miners ’ law. These codes universally required that a man
work his claim and limited what he could claim to no more
than he could work. Thus property did not find a tangible
manifestation in land , but rather was defined in a man's
ability to labor. This gave substance to the sense of
equality in the mines. 8
Placer mining required little beyond the physical
presence and effort of the miner. The tools and methods
were simple. Only a small plot or length of stream bank was
necessary for a claim. Other occupations required skills ,
capital , land , or some combination. In California ,
determination , a pan , and a shovel , along with a bit of
luck , could make a man rich in a season. Alexander Saxton
maintained that in the California foothills , I’ the producer
ethic found a basis of genuinely equal opportunity."9
But the virtue of the producer ethic was stained by the
crass avarice of the success ethic. Men came to California
8 For a discussion of land laws in the mining regions
see Charles Howard Shinn , Minina Camos: A Studv in American
Frontier Government (1885; reprint , New York: Alfred A.
Knopf , 1948) , 221-246.
9 Alexander Saxton , The Indisoensable Enemv
(Berkeley , Los Angeles , and London: University of California
Press , 1971) , 52.
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to get rich. Holliday characterizes the gold seekers as
lacking in a sense of civic responsibility:
These people came to take , not to build ..
they found themselves surrounded by crowds of
hurrying men concerned only with how to make
the greatest amount of money in the shortest
time. with that common motive , they als。
shared an indifference toward California and
its future .... No one wanted to be tied down
and burdened by social responsibility.'o
Their civic identity was undeveloped. They were a sea
。f faceless men , lacking a common past , and moving about
incessantly." The population was overwhelmingly young and
male. They lived in tents and other temporary dwellings ,
not homes. The conventional enforcers of the moral order
family , church , and employer -- were by and large absent.
The mi r. ing areas characterized the primitive community
。rganization in California. Mining camps grew and died at a
bewildering rate; they often had an ephemeral character. It
was here that the men that came to California congregated
and faced nature. Individually , or in small groups , miners
passionately pursued their self-interest.
The California experience was harsh. The miners
strived to fashion wealth directly from nature. They were
acquisitive , mobile risk-takers. This changing , uncertain
society of equals , each endeavoring to subdue nature for his
own interest , lent a sense of insecurity to California.
'0
"
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Williams , 136-137.
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This insecurity felt dangerously close to anarchy or a state
。 f nature.
California was on the one hand frantic and unstable.
But it also had the uniformity of individuals joined
together by common pursuit of their individual interest:
gold. The mutually reinforcing dispositions of
individualism and majoritarianism in Americans came int。
play in the mining regions.
Mary Floyd Williams defined the "crucial moment" for
miners as that when an individual prospector ’ s strike became
public knowledge. The situation would bring together
"excited men , in a remote mountain gorge , with gold
uncovered at their feet and loaded weapons in their
hands."12 Williams drew a scene of miners laying aside
their guns and amicably dividing the placer in a fair and
equitable manner. She attributed this solution to "swift
agreement by the will of the majority on matters of common
interest , and cheerful loyalty to such decisions."13
The miners were certainly committed majoritarians. But
Williams ignored an essential aspect of her "crucial moment"
in the miners ’ existence: the coercive power of the
majority. There was little a lone prospector could do when
faced with a group of interlopers. And should he combine
with them he would gain security and the individual power
12
13
Ibid. , 65.
Ibid.
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inherent in association. Popular sovereignty was not the
benign arbiter of social good as Williams characterized it.
The threat of violence and disorder were compelling motives
for a maintenance of consensus.
In important ways the social combinations of the miners
resembled a Lockean contract. They were men in a state of
nature (or very close to it) who gave up a portion of their
liberty in exchange for security of their property , in this
case the security of one ’ 5 claim and gold.
As they expanded and extended political power , pushing
it closer to a state of nature , Americans remained concerned
with the preservation of social order and the protection of
the individual. Faced with a virgin continent , Americans
had always sought to rise above a state of nature , to a
society where rights could be secured. Even under the
influence of the grasping success ethic they recognized the
feebleness of the individual. The sanctity of property and ,
later , the dignity of labor , had served as bulwarks t。
protect individual liberty. Both derived their power from
the will of the community. If men were to use wealth t。
ensure their liberty , it , too , would require the community
for its preservation. The mass of citizens had t。
collaborate to protect their individual liberty from
government , monopolies , or depraved minorities. 14
14 For a discussion in this vein of Californians ’
。pposition to existing government during the early gold rush
and their attempts to create their own government see David
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MINERS AND MERCHANTS
The growth in the ?opulation of California , and San
Francisco in particular , was impressive but not
unprecedented in America. Chicago , for instance , grew at a
remarkable rate during the antebellum period. Yet n。
vigilantes seized power there. The hinterlands of Illinois ,
however , were not filled with gold. The presence of gold
was fundamental to the California experience. It was gold ,
after all , which defined the mass of immigrants that carne to
San Francisco. There were two groups of fortune seekers:
those who planned to make their "pile" in the mines and
those who planned to profit from the abundance of miners.
These two groups shared some characteristics; most notably ,
virtually all were men , relatively young , and had recently
immigrated to California. Most of them also shared a
commitment to antebellum American values of democracy. They
believed in an equality that allowed all to jockey for
status in an American society in which wealth was the most
widely accepted measure of merit.
The different methods these two groups , miners and
merchants , employed to seek wealth is crucial t。
understanding the San Francisco vigilance committees. The
A. Johnson , Foundinq the Far West: California , Oreaon , and
Nevada , 1840-1890 (Berkeley , Los Angeles , and Oxford:
university of California Press , 1992) , 15-40.
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miners came from a society that was anchored in the producer
ethic , but was increasingly animated by the success ethic.
They hoped to circumvent the long-term commitment that the
producer ethic assumed. Few, if any , dreamed of setting
down roots in California in the same way that the farmers of
Oregon ’ s Willamette Valley or Illinois had done. The miners
thought that a season , perhaps two , of hard work would make
them wealthy men.
This said , a proximate (not immediate) longing for
middle-class respectability did drive the miners. They
accepted bourgeois standards of success. The rich placers
held the promise of fortune without the conventional mode of
attaining it via delayed gratification. The credibility of
wealth that California's gold promised to bring could be
attained without the burdensome middle-class routine of
thrift , sobriety , self-control , and the prospect of endless
work. The miners were in some ways reconciled to the
middle-class order and yet dedicated to avoiding the life
that was normally associated with such standards.
If the miners were adventurers with dreams of nearly
painless transformation to the higher reaches of society ,
the merchants were , initially at least , similar. Peter
Decker has chronicled the uncertainties of the California
market and the high turnover in San Francisco's merchant
class. Like the loiners San Francisc。 ’ s merchants were an
impermanent population with an uncertain future. The
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consignment of a cargo from the east -- any cargo , it was
thought -- could be sold at high prices to the miners
producing correspondingly high profits. A particularly
fortuitous selection of merchandise would translate int。
even greater profits. One shrewd speculation might produce
a fortune. Of course the reverse was true as well. 15 As
Decker (and others) have pointed out , gold rush merchants
desired a less volatile marketplace. 16
Equality was magnified by the country ’ s fluid social
structure. A week of good panning or a fortuitous load of
merchandise could catapult a miner or merchant into the
first ranks of society. But as the initial excitement of
the gold rush wore off these sort of opportunities began t。
be seen as exceptional.
As time went on , stacks of unsold merchandise covered
San Francisc。’ s streets and wharves. Merchants began t。
accept that more conventional commerce , and not rapid
accumulation , would be typical of San Francisc。’ s business ,
as it was in the East. As the exhilaration of the city's
merchants subsided , they settled in for the long haul. They
15 Peter R. Decker , Fortunes and Failures: White-
Collar Mobility in Nineteenth-Century San Francisc。
(Cambridge , Massachusetts and London: Harvard university
Press , 1978) , 32-59.
16 Decker , 37-52; Robert M. Senkewicz , Viailantes in
Gold Rush San Francisc。 (Stanford , California: Stanford
University Press , 1985) , 36-43; Roger W. Lotchin , 흐효므
Francisco , 1846-1856 , From Hamlet to City (Lincoln , Nebraska
and London: University of Nebraska Press , 1974) , 49-64.
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began to expect middle class behavior not only of
themselves , but of the others who inhabited "their" city.
The drunkenness , gambling , and general rowdiness that had
been typical of California life were recognized as an
impediment to the establishment of more conventional
lifestyles and forms of business.
Before San Francisco could become a solid , middle class
city it had to mature , build institutions , and establish
cultural restraints. But the "settlers" in the city were
still far outnumbered by the transient portion of the
population. Institutions , of both society and government ,
needed to be developed to transform San Francisco into a
respectable city. The influence of society and culture were
needed to remove the roughest edges from the city. As the
city ’ s major newspaper , the Alta California 。bserved in the
summer of 1851 , "the lyceum and the lecture room were on the
。ther side of the continent. ,, 17
There were few institutions of government in California
when the gold rush deluged the region in 1849. But what
institutions that existed (the military government and
Mexican forms of government) immediately clashed with
American precepts about government. This aggravated
traditional American suspicions of government. The bulk of
California ’ s population was relatively apathetic toward the
development of government (except for that which would
17 Alta California (San Francisco) , 18 June 1851.
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secure their mining rights long enough to extract wealth
from the earth). The portion of the population that was
interested in government , the merchant class , was also the
busiest. But , imbued with the American spirit , they
expected the government to answer when they called. This
resulted in a crisis-oriented and haphazard civic life.
As civil governments were elected and put into place ,
many San Francisco merchants saw only the
institutionalization of the defects that had heretofore
existed in California. They complained about the
incompetence and feebleness of the local and state
authorities with vigor. By late 1850 the 욕A후르， having
decried the lack of government during the interregnum ,
charged that the state and city governments were worse than
no law at all. Their stupidity and incompetence was costly ,
the laws they passed were contemptible; they encouraged
lawlessness. The Alta estimated that San Francisco would be
between "one thousand per cent" and "infinitely" better off
without the city charter and the laws passed by the
councils. 18 San Francisco had not settled down as quickly
as it had grown up , and this bothered many merchants.
The general disregard for social conventions and
behavior took on magnified importance in light of the
devastating fires the city experienced and what seemed to be
a rising , or at least unacceptable , level of crime. Fires
18 Ibid. , 5 January , 21 February 1851.
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had been a problem even before the gold rush , but beginning
with the first great fire in December 1849 the city suffered
from a series of what Roger Lotchin has characterized as
"holocaust[s]." Three terrible fires in 1850 were followed
by two more in 1851. 19 Much smaller and less destructive
fires served as a regular reminder of the possibility of
fire raging out of control. The lawmakers of the city and
state seemed incapable of creating a system that would
alleviate these problems.
Much of the dissatisfaction with government revolved
around this perceived (and actual) increase in crime and the
authorities ’ apparent inability or unwillingness to combat
it. The popular justice of the mines , though without legal
sanction , was influential because of the perception that it
was capable of bringing about justice.
Americans have been intuitively reconciled with the
notion that an abstract sense of justice , and not the
imperfections of concrete laws , should guide society. As
the makers of law , the people can legitimately claim to be
the arbiters of social order. There has rarely been
sympathy for those who engage in criminal activity unless
that activity is directed against unpopular institutions or
is the result of the perpetrator ’ s desperation. Such
apologies for criminal behavior were absent in San
Francisco. The city lacked strong institutions. The
19 Lotchin , 174-175.
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richness of the mining regions seemed to preclude the
necessity for crime due to unfortunate circumstances. While
boisterousness , fights , and drunkenness found acceptance
with a large part of the population , larceny , robbery , and
murder were considered particularly reprehensible behaviors
in the (apparent) land of plenty.
SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE MINES: LYNCHING
In the mines transgressors of the social order were
。ften dealt with summarily , but usually thLough some
mechanism which involved the immediate community to some
extent. The "law of the mines" required some sort of
hearing , though it often was exceedingly informal and did
not uniformly provide the accused with representation.
Judgments were made by the entire body of gathered miners or
by a selected group. In either case they could be fairly
classified as demonstrations of popular governance.
Representative of this was the report of a man sentenced for
burglary and theft: "He was executed with the unanimous
approval of the people of Stockton."~ The accused were
not provided with conventional legal protections , but rather
relied on a sense of fairness or justice from the assemblage
。r its officers. In this way it was a stark illustration of
the power of a community governed by popular sovereignty.
20 표lt르， 9 August 1849.
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The individual and collective sense of justice was enforced
through the power of numbers. 21
David Johnson has documented more than 200 cases of
lynching in California between 1849 and 1853. 22 Most of
these occurred in the mines or along the supply corridors
that served the mining regions. Punishment , due to a lack
。f jails , was physical. Whipping , beating, banishment
(sometimes accompanied by mutilation to identify the
transgressor) , and hanging were employed. Some suspects
were remanded to the authorities. Others were acquitted by
the miners ’ courts .23
The 욕L죠르 reported a typical example of the methods of
justice in the mines. After it was learned that four men
had robbed the proprietors of a drinking and gambling
establishment at Dry Diggings of $600 ,
a large party of armed citizens proceeded t。
the house of the four robbers and arrested
21 See Paul , 202-206; Williams , 148-152; Josiah Royce ,
California , From the Conauest in 1846 to the Second
Viailance Committee in San Francisco (reprint , New York:
Alfred A. Knopf , 1948) , 256-271; Shinn , 119-120 , 216-219;
Bayard Taylor , Eldorado , or , Adventures in the Path of
Emoire: Comorisina a Vovaae to California , via Panama; Life
in San Francisco and Monterev: Pictures of the Gold Reaion
(New York: G. P. Putnam and Son , 1850 ,1862; reprint , New
York: Alfred A. Knopf , 1949) , 76-78.
~ David A. Johnson , "Vigilance and the Law: The Moral
Authority of Popular Justice in the Far West ," A.rnerican
Quarterlv 33 (Winter 1981): 564. Richard Maxwell Brown has
considered vigilantism and violence on a national scale.
See his Strain of Violence: Historical Studies in Violence
and Viailantism (New York: Oxford University Press , 1975).
23 See Johnson , "Vigilance and the Law ," 564 , 570.
79
them. The next day the citizens assembled
and selected three judges who were to try the
four men. Twelve jurymen were drawn by
ballot , and the trial at once took place.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty of
robbery , and the four men were sentenced to
receive thirty-nine lashes each ~nd to be
banished forever from the mines. 24
The sentence was carried out the next day. For the 묘A프효 it
was "most gratifying to observe the determined spirit of
justice which actuate the people thus situated , and the
creditable zeal with which this outrage has been
punished. ‘’ 25 But there were limits to the Alt효;흐
enthusiasm for popular forms of punishment. It was
"inexpressibly shocked" when a committee of the state
legislature considered authorizing whipping as a punishment
for grand and petit larceny.26 In another instance it
hoped the people of Stockton had not resorted to "the
barbarous forms of Judge Lynch; such as shaving the head ,
lopping the ears , and other disgraceful mutilations of the
person." Such punishments were a "mockery of law and [an]
outrage [to) ... humanity. 써7
In the first years of the gold rush the Ai투료， while
nominally deprecating lynch law , continually praised its
effectiveness: "Criminals stand but a poor chance in the
24 Alta , 8 February 1849.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid. , 10 April 1850.
27 Ibid. , 9 August 1849.
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mines. ,, 28 Though insisting that a revision of the laws
would remedy the situation , the paper intimated that
established areas , such as San Francisco , would be forced t。
resort to the methods of the mines to protect themselves ,
due to the inefficacy of the laws.
There is a set of devilish thieves and
villains about this city, and we fear their
depredations can only be checked by the
prompt sentence of Judge Lynch. Police and
courts seem to be but little dreaded if at
all , and afford little protection. We hope
the next robbery committ~d will cost the
villain an aeri~l dance.~
The 관A죠르:흐 flirtation with lynch law illustrated the
ambiguity of its commitment to middle class values of law
and order and its congeniality to the methods of social
control employed in the mines.
MIDDLE CLASS VALUES IN SAN FRANCISCO
This desire for the institutionalization of middle
class values is apparent throughout the columns of the 표A흐르
in 1850 and 1851. The editor concerned himself with issues
that were likely far from the minds of most fortune hunters
in California: the need for public schools and orphanages;
the necessity of segregating lunatics , women , and minors
from the general jail population; the deleterious effects of
28
29
Ibid. , 3 June 1850.
Ibid. , 2 October 1850.
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gambling , both on the gamblers themselves and the city at
large; the virtue of voting for the "best" man as opposed t。
party-line voting; and the general call for better city
services (fire , police , roads , etc.) , sometimes even
accompanied by suggestions of raising revenue to pay for
them. The editor was gratified at the increased observance
。f the sabbath and the proliferation in churches. These
issues were typical concerns expressed by those wishing t。
impose middle-class expectations on the community , and not ,
one would expect , foremost in the minds of typical
California miners or temporary residents of San
Francisco. 30
Voluntary organizations were also manifestations of the
desire for a conventional social order. 31 The California
Guard (a militia unit) and the fire companies provided
camaraderie and served useful functions within the community
30 Ibid. , On the need for schools and hospitals see 12
July 1850; on lunatic asylums see 3 April , 13 May 1851; on
the Ladies Orphanage Asylum see 21 June 1851; on the need t。
segregate women and minors see 11 November 1850 , 1 April , 26
May , 23 July 1851; on party-line voting see 20 June , S
October 1850 , 22 July 1851; on gambling see 13 October , 28
November , 19 December 1850 , 26 January , 1 February , 4 April ,
6 June 1851; regarding the observance of the sabbath and
churches see 25 May , 1 June , 18 , 20 July 1851.
31 On the role of voluntary associations see Don
Harrison Doyle , The Social Order of a Frontier Community:
Jacksonville , Illinois , 1825-1870 (Urbana , Chicago , and
London: Universityof Illinois Press , 1978) , especially 11-
16 and 156-157 , and Mary P. Ryan , Cradle of the Middle
Class: The Familv in Oneida Countv , New York , 1790-1865
(Cambridge , London , and New York: Cambridge University
Press , 1981) , 127-132.
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but were not necessarily exclusively middle class. They
were examples of harmonizing institutions that cut across
class lines. Others seemed more typically middle class: the
Chamber of Commerce , the Merchants Exchange , the Society of
California Pioneers , the Antheneum Club , the Eureka Society ,
the Odd Fellows , the Masons , the San Francisco Antiquarian
Society and San Francisco Academy of Arts and Sciences , and
the Sons of Temperance.
The Alta California was decidedly middle class in its
tone and spoke for the emerging commercial class. Tw。
complaints in particular demonstrated the paper ’ s
prejudices. Both instances illustrate a rejection of the
audacious public behavior that suffused California. The
editor ’ s complaints foreshadowed the underlying tension
between middle class values of order and the prevailing
sentiment in California for a continuation of the
freewheeling status quo.
The crudeness San Franciscans exhibited at political
gatherings demonstrated to the Al투효 a need for restraints on
behavior. The editor fumed about those who "disturb the
harmony of meetings for the creation of what they conceive
to be 'fun ’ ."~ When a procession protesting what they
perceived to be high taxes marched to a town square , a
number of the crowd hissed and groaned at the Common
Council. The 표후프르 saw this "deliberate insult" to duly
32 표L호르， 29 April 1850.
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elected officials as the "action of a mob. ,, 33 For many San
Franciscans politics was useful only insofar as it had
entertainment value. Even settled parts of the United
States had their boisterous political elements. In San
Francisco , where the average citizen was young and male ,
rowdiness could be expected to be the norm.
In another case , the editor of the 관A투르 denounced a
portion of an anti-tax crowd that included men who were
"possessed of the most radical and levelling ideas [and]
were in favor of no taxation and no government , upon the
general principle that all men are born free and equal and
。ught to be able to govern themselves. ,, 34 Clearly , the
editor felt a need to establish controls on the ungoverned
portion of society. And , just as clearly , he believed that
there was a significant element in California that needed t。
be restrained.
Even the merchant class had , at best , an uneasy
appreciation for the city government and its functions.
They were conditioned to democracy yet wary of the majority
which seemed disposed to excess and abandoned behavior. In
the best American tradition the commercial class adapted t。
the conditions of San Francisco. They found a way t。
incorporate their values of order into the unconfined male
society of California.
33
34
Ibid. , 5 June 1850.
Ibid. , 11 June 1850.
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SOCIAL CONTROL IN SAN FRANCISCO
One of the veneers of civilization in San Francisco was
the use of more modern methods of social control: municipal
police , courts , and incarceration as a method of punishment.
In the spring of 1850 a hopeful 표4투르 reported on the city ’ s
"well-arranged and indefatigable police" and "our Courts of
Justice in which the weak are protected from the attacks of
the strong. "35 But the city' s residents felt ambivalent
toward government generally and these institutions had not
yet become firmly established. The acceptance of a
professional justice system was hampered by the presence of
another model: the methods of the mines. The alternative
offered by lynch law as practiced in the mines , was
especially attractive in socially undeveloped California.
The 욕It르 recognized that society in California was not
mature: "a social compact is wanting , and a social system
imperatively demanded."~
Law enforcement in the mines was associated with
lynching. Not until the formation of the vigilance
committee was anyone hanged in San Francisco. However ,
several incidents in which lynching was advocated indicate
that the practice was not unfamiliar to the city. Late in
1850 , while complaining of crime , the Al후르 suggested that if
35
36
Ibid. , 17 May , 5 March 1850.
Ibid. , 22 December 1849.
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the authorities did not act more vigorously , that an
"outraged community" would turn itself into a "Lynch
tribunal. ,, 37
During the first week of January 1851 , a pickpocket was
nearly hanged by an angry crowd. A police officer succeeded
in taking the suspect to jail. 38 A month later a pieman
was shot by a man reputed to be a thief. It was only with
"difficulty the people were restrained from Lynching the
scoundrel."~ The most striking incident , prior to the
acts of the vigilance committee , occurred two weeks later.
Two men were nearly hanged even after a citizen ’ s court had
acquitted them.
The Jansen incident , as it became known , is generally
seen as a precursor to the committee. In the wake of the
excitement the 표A드르 printed a warning to "rogues" that the
"community seem to be determined to inflict summary
punishment upon any man caught in criminal act."~ When
the editor of the San Francisc。 턴트드효L브， William Walker，이
was jailed for contempt of court by Judge Parsons , a number
。f citizens advocated extricating Walker by force from the
37 Ibid. , 31 December 1850.
38 Ibid. , 5 January 1851.
39 Ibid. , 7 February 1851.
~ Ibid. , 26 February 1851.
4• This is the same William Walker who later gained
notoriety for his filibustering expeditions in Nicaragua.
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jail. The crowd settled for "strong condemnatory
resolutions ," and calls for Parsons ’ s resignation or
impeachment. 42 A strong escort of police prevented William
Slater , accused of the murder of Captain Jarvis , from being
taken by a group of horsemen bent on inflicting their own
punishment. 43 In May , the editor of the Al프효 angrily
denounced those who allowed convicts from Sydney to arrive
in San Francisco aboard ship. The "authors and abettors of
this outrage ," thundered the 표A프르， "deserve to be lynched
without mercy for their villainy."~ Though no lynchings
had yet taken place in San Francisco , it figured prominently
as a possible solution to the citizens ’ frustrations.
San Francisco could not escape the context of a
California defined by the mines and the miners. Extralegal
modes of social control were acceptable in California s。
long as they had the community ’ s endorsement. The
endorsement of the community was also necessary for duly
authorized forms of social control. In more established
areas alternative models of social control (such as
vigilantism) were absent or poorly defined. The urban riots
of the East Coast certainly were efforts to modify behavior:
but lacked a coherent apparatus to methodically pursue a
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given set of objectives. 45 San Franciscans had a readily
available model: vigilantism. The merchants , with a
disposition toward organization , were well equipped to adapt
the spontaneous vigilantism of the mines along well-ordered
lines of conventional middle class organizations.
The resort to vigilantism by San Franciscans was a
response to changing conditions in California. The state
was becoming more settled and more receptive to typical
middle class attitudes and behavior. The Alta could "see
the germs of a far more healthy state of feeling springing
into life among us. A large proportion of our population is
。f right description , hardy , enterprising, industrious , wh。
love good laws and good government , and who will make the
。ne and support the other. ,, 46 "The fact is ," asserted the
욕A후효， "we are fast settling down into the permanent customs
and habits of the Atlantic cities. ,, 47
The merchant class of San Francisco was becoming more
confident and assertive. This assertiveness manifested
itself in one way through the vigilance committee of 1851.
In California the notions of order and popular , extralegal
action were reconcilable. Vigilantism , although it was
illegal , so long as it exhibited the virtues of dignity ,
discipline , and fairness , could be the very embodiment of
45 Supra , Chapter I , 42-43.
46 욕A토르， 30 December 1850.
Q Ibid. , 20 March 1851.
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the American ideal of self-government. By June of 1851 the
city ’ s merchants , or many of them , had convinced themselves
that it was their duty to take matters of justice into their
。wn hands.
Expectedly , the first hints of this drift t。
vigilantism came from the mines. In the last part of 1850
the 표A드르 was becoming alarmed by robberies and murders in
the mining regions that , it claimed , were going
unpunished.~ It was important that the effects of new
state laws were partly to blame for this development:
Among the reasons that conspire to make this
sad change since last year , when such crimes
were few and generally followed with speedy
punishment , may undoubtedly be reckoned the
inefficiency of the laws , as now existing in
the courts , ~nd codes established by the
legislature. 49
Popular action , through lynchings , had seemed to impose
。rdεr. Government action seemed poorly ad~pted to the
special circumstances of California.
The migratory character of the mines made them
unsuitable for conventional laws. The transitory nature of
the mining population made it necessary for suspects to be
tried promptly , before witnesses had left the area. The
표추흐르 demanded that the legislature "adapt the law to the
~ For examples of crime in California see 표4후르 19 , 31
July , 9 August , 16 September , 2 , 13 , 26 October , 12 , 28
December 1850.
49 Ibid. , 16 September 1850.
89
necessities of the country."50
It did not take long for this affliction of unpunished
crime to find its way to San Francisco. By the end of the
year , according to the 효It르， there had been a "horrible
increase in crime." Robberies and murders were committed
"without any apparent dread of detection and punishment."
The city administration was warned to act lest "an outraged
community take into their own hands the administration of
law."51 The government was being put on notice that there
would be consequences for its inaction.
The source of this explosion of criminal behavior ,
according to the 표L후효， was two-fold. Part of it stemmed
from the unrestrained society in California; a "general
laxity of moral feeling ," as the 욕It효 termed it. The other
came from the presence of supposedly large numbers of
convicts who had corne from Britain ’ s penal colonies.~
These convicts were blamed as "the great leprosy that is
rendering the whole surface of our present society hateful
50
51
Ibid.
Ibid. , 31 December 1850.
52 Senkewicz reports figures showing that less than
twenty percent of the immigrants from Australia were ex-
convicts , 79. See also Jay Monaghan , Australians and the
Gold Rush: California and Down Under , 1849-1854 (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press , 1966).
Even the 표It효 wondered whether Sydney immigrants had been
blamed for too large a share of the crime committed in San
Francisco; see 26 October 1850.
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and disgusting.""
For these reasons , according to the 욕4후르， California
lacked the restraints of law and public opinion. "Here the
cry of gold and a fancied impunity in evil brought" those of
questionable character.~ Many who had "maintained
tolerable characters" in more established parts of the
country , when freed from the restraints of society in
California , "at once threw themselves into the dissolute and
abandoned courses , which , not principle but restraint had
previously kept them from. "55 Such men lacking in self-
discipline clearly would have to have restraint imposed upon
them by the power of the community. This group included not
。nly criminals , but the large numbers of men who did not
behave themselves.
During the early days of the gold rush the moderation
。f behavior through public sentiment was problematic. The
torrent of gold seekers who flooded the country could hardly
form a community complete with a "public opinion." But by
the end of 1850 the Alta declared that "things have
altered." Importantly , "a better class of persons have come
like a flood into the country. Better morals have gradually
gained strength and popularity."%
53 욕It르， 20 November 1850.
54 Ibid. , 19 December 1850.
55 Ibid. , 26 October 1850.
56 Ibid. , 19 December 1850.
91
This reported influx of "hardy , enterprising ,
industrious" people and good morals did not alleviate the
felt need for vigilante action a few months later , but
rather encouraged it. 57 It made the middle class feel more
powerful and willing to act as if from a position of
strength. Movements toward reform or change are rarely , if
ever , the result of a feeling of desperation and
powerlessness , no matter what the protestations of the
reformers might be.
The 표L후르 found a source of this improvement in the
"exhaustion of the enormously rich gold deposits." This
produced benefits for California because
as the averag8 returns for toil have
decreased , the fact has produced an average
increase of common sens~ ， thrift , economy ,
and decency of conduct. 58
The easy availability of gold promised immense rewards
without a commensurate amount of work , and this , according
to the 욕L투르， was not conducive to the development of solid
values. Middle class morals were associated the acquisition
。 f wealth through regular work and deferred gratification.
In California the acquisition had been associated with
neither of these characteristics. But the depletion of
easily accessible deposits of gold would allow the
traditional relationship between work and reward to assert
57
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itself. If gold was losing its grip on San Francisc。’ s
psyche , it would create an opportunity for the merchants to
assert their own. San Francisco seemed ripe for bourgeois
restraint.
The other source of crime in California was
straightforward. The 표A후르 charged that California had
become the "grand rendezvous" for the convicts of Britain ’ s
Australian penal colonies. 59 It was conceded that not
every Sydney immigrant was a convict , that some of them were
fine citizens who might be enlisted in the cause of law and
。rder. Indeed , Robert Senkewicz reported that Australians
were more likely than their American counterparts to live in
traditional family groups in San Francisco.~ Despite
this , San Franciscans were convinced that expert criminals ,
late of the British penal colonies , had come to California
and leagued together to bring ruin to the state.
There was an advantage in having an identifiable source
of the crime that seemed to plague San Francisco (though
some of it was admitted to be American in origin). It made
it easier to combat. It was , after all , illegal t。
transport felons into the United States. The strict
enforcement of these laws would help stem the influx of
criminals. Those that remained operated in "systematic" and
59
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"well drilled" gangs. M It was expected that vigorous
efforts to detect criminals and a few examples of punishment
would convince the members of these gangs that California
was no longer a congenial environment for their lifestyle.
CALIFORNIA JUSTICE
It was the perceived failure of the constituted
authorities to either detect or punish offenders that built
the momentum that culminated in the vigilance committee.
The biggest complaint about the courts were the delays that
。ccurred. The transient nature of California society meant
that vital witnesses were unlikely to remain if trials took
too long for their liking. The 욕추흐르 maintained that , "Every
man knows that in our state of society , a delay is
equivalent to a mis-trial or acquittance."~
These delays were seen as a manipulation of the justice
system by devious lawyers that were tolerated by judges of
questionable merit. The ease with which accused criminals
could obtain delays that ensured their eventual freedom made
them contemptuous of the courts. They did not fear the
authorities. In granting delays "crime has been fostered
61 욕후토효， 18 Dec 1850 , 5 March 1851. A reference to a
"regularly organized gang of these Sydney thieves" appears
。n 22 Feb 1851.
62 Ibid. , 24 February 1851.
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instead of checked by the courts."~ The courts were thus
partly responsible for crime:
Our courts , instead of being a terror t。
evil-doers , have proved themselves the
protectors ηf villains , and thus encouragers
of crime. This is a hard accusation , but it
is true.""
The constituted authorities were useless since they did not
secure life or property. California needed "a system of
legal adjudication , which shall be like the country , quick
and effective."M
The 표후곡르 claimed that it only desired a "revision of
。ur present inefficient system" of laws.~ But this
appeared to be posturing. It praised "Judge Lynch" in a
fashion that was more convincing. The editor made an
important distinction between lynch law and its "counterfeit
rival Mob Law." Lynch law was undertaken in a sober ,
considered manner. And its record compared favorably with
the regular courts in California:
Justice , fresh from the people , where blind
excitement does not reign , is preferable ,
more honest , just and certain than when
entangled like a grandfather l£nglegs in the
webs of forty cunning spiders.~
Government had failed. Another means of enforcing order was
63 Ibid. , 23 February 1851.
64 Ibid. , 24 February 1851.
65 Ibid.
~ Ibid. , 5 January 1851.
67 Ibid. , 13 October 1850.
95
essential (according to the 표It르) and the example of lynch
law appealed to San Franciscans.
The brief experience of the gold rush led Californians
to trust men more than laws. They found the governments
that claimed to rule in California to be wanting and ,
inculcated with the American impulse for self-government ,
were unruffled by popular justice , including hangings. Yet
many longed for the tangible consensus that conventional
government and society represented. The desire for a
settled order contrasted with the impermanence that
distinguished most of California.
The men in California were not sure how best to face
the future. Even if men wanted California to slow down and
behave with perfect middle class deportment , it was not
clear how this was to be accomplished. The 표L프르 noted
California was a place where men were tried by "wild freedom
and loose liberty."68 To impose social order some
Californians employed the lawless methods that symbolized
the absence of conventional authority in their state.
68 Ibid. , 16 April 1851.
CHAPTER IV
SP~ FP~~!CISCO: METROPOLIS OR MINING CAMP?
San Francisco and the mines were set in the same
context of gold rush California. They shared and exchanged
inhabitants , goods , and ideas. San Francisco was
California ’ s portal to the rest of the world. But it was
the mines that defined California. Even the gold rush's
metropolis was stamped with the orientation and attitudes of
the mines.
Yet the city and the mines were set apart by their
distinctive economic pursuits. The mines were characterized
by irregular periods of work and frequent movement. San
Francisco was the metropolis of the gold rush and the center
of its commerce. Like the mines it had an overwhelmingly
transient population. Even among the merchant ranks there
was substantial turnover. But as businessmen the nature of
their work contrasted with that of the miners. It was more
regular. The orderly , harmonious society that was ideal for
commerce would have difficulty in replacing the unrestrained
atmosphere that thrived amongst the adventurers of the
m~nes.
Yet even with this instability a merchant class was
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forming in San Francisco and was soon the leading catalyst
for change in that city. These men wanted the institutions
。f government , uniform laws , internal improvements , and
security for their property. They wanted conditions that
would facilitate business. In the confusion of gold rush
California a middle class carne to power. But even as San
Francisco grew to dominate California as its link with the
。utside world , the city could not escape the influence the
mines exerted upon it.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT IN SAN FRANCISCO
The mining regions had , at best , limited use for normal
forms of government. The relatively efficient systems of
securing mining claims (which were often very informal) met
the most prominent regulatory need of the miners.
Drunkenness , rowdyism , and gambling, offensive to middle
class sensibilities , generally did not interfere with mining
life , and could be tolerated. Theft , robbery , and murder ,
which did interfere , were dealt with through informal
majoritarian mechanisms , often referred to as the "law of
the mines." Conventional institutions of crime control
(courts , police , jails , and the like) , were not well-suited
to the ephemeral society of the mines as they required
permanent governing bodies. Such permanence was elusive
amongst a restless population intent only upon finding a big
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strike.
The pursuit of gold kept the attention of many from
focusing on political developments , or the lack thereof.
There were many other amusements to occupy Californians (and
drain their pocketbooks). A good portion of these
diversions (drinking, whoring , gambling, and general
rowdiness) , were not socially acceptable back home , or at
least , the editor of the 효A후효 thought this was so. In an
editorial he suggested that California stripped away social
restraint. "When the seekers of treasure left their old
homes and associations in the United States and Europe , they
were released from the regulating power of public opinion
and law to a great extent … ."' Another time he lamented
that men were "tried by the wild freedom and loose liberty
which California has given so extensively to the world."
California , he alleged , had an adversely affected some men:
The remark has frequently been made that the
most sober , quiet steady people in the
States , as soon as they have reached here ,
have , in a great many cases , become the
reverse , drinking , spr~eing ， disorderly ,
gambling, and vicious.~
Whether vice and disorder in California were really more
prevalent than in Chicago , New Orleans or elsewhere was not
Alta California (San Francisco) , 18 June 1851.
2 Ibid. , 16 April 1850.
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important to those with a middle class vision for San
Francisco. What was important was that the popularity of
these activities in California revealed a population that
did not share the middle class expectations of the 표료효닐
editor and like-minded men.
There were , however , many Californians eager for
familiar forms of government and society , none more so than
the members of the Legislative Assembly of the District of
San Francisco. 3 These men were unhappy with the condition
。f government in 1849. The federal government had failed t。
provide civil government or a system of civil law for
California. As a result , the military government which had
been set up during the Mexican-American War , continued t。
。perate with a motley collection of Mexican , American , and
military forms of government. 4 The president justified the
continuance of the military government on the basis that
Californians had given their "presumed consent" to the
military government. 5 Californians , at least those with
business or political aspirations , were anxious to obtain a
civil government that was either created or recognized by
the federal government. The lack of civil government led t。
insecurity , both psychological and physical. Without a
permanently recognized authority , land titles , for instance ,
3
4
5
Ibid. , 14 June , 19 , 26 July , 9 August 1849.
Ibid. , 11 January , 20 March 1850.
Ibid. , 26 April 1849.
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would never be certain. Government was not particularly
important to most of the legion that was descending on
California hoping to find gold and return home rich men.
But it was essential to those who planned to stay in
California. Those who saw their future in California wanted
to impose some order over it. 6
In light of the lack of federal action some
Californians contemplated the creation of their own
government without prior approval from washington , D.C. A
correspondent to the Alta California thought it unquestioned
that ,
the people of California , under existing
circumstances , have the right to exercise
that power inherent in human nature -- the
power to institute government for the
protectiog of life , liberty , and the right of
property. ’
The president was abusing his executive power by insisting
。n the continued authority of the military government. The
writer admitted that the president might proceed upon the
grounds of "presumed consent" (as President Polk had done)
so long as the people had not organized their own
government.
The writer hinted at the future justifications of
Californians for taking matters into their own hands.
6 Regarding attitudes toward government in California
see David A. Johnson , Foundina the Far west: California ,
Oreaon , and Nevada , 1849-1890 (Berkeley , Los Angeles , and
Oxford: University of California Press , 1992) , 15-40.
7 Al후르， 26 April 1849.
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Action was required because of the peculiar situation in
which Californians found themselves. The "existing
circumstances" were such that it required men to exercise a
power that existed in them in a state of nature. California
was a special case , but their actions were sanctioned by
universal truths.
Complaints were also directed at Congress both for its
action and for its inaction: it levied taxes on Californians
while affording them no representation. The 좌It르 raged over
this affront on the sacred Revolutionary principle of "n。
taxation without representation."
The only civil judicial officer in San Francisco was
the alcalde. Though he was supposedly enforcing Mexican
law , he had no familiarity with it and could not read
Spanish. There were no higher courts to which appeals could
be made. Civil government seemed to concerned San
Franciscans to be "vague , uncertain , shapeless , and
inefficient. "8
In February 1849 , Californians , or some of them , took
it upon themselves to pursue the creation of their own
government and elected a Legislative Assembly of the
District of San Francisco on their own initiative and
without official sanction. The Assembly justified itself on
the basis of the unusual circumstances brought on by the
gold rush and the absence of civil government. The
8 Ibid. , 9 August 1849.
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discovery of seemingly limitless deposits of gold had
brought a jumbled mix of men to California , all imbued with
a "feverish desire for fortune-making." This had produced
an "anomalous" population. But "the state of our
government is still more unprecedented and alarming. We are
in fact without government." (emphasis original)9 If
Congress did nothing and the president supported a
"despotic" military government , then it was the duty of the
people to institute government themselves.
The combination of these conditions led the Assembly t。
。pine in an address to the people of the District of San
Francisco regarding state government that ,
there is but one of two courses to take ,
either to remain in a state of perfect
anarchy and confusion , or to form a
governmen~ for ourselves.(emphasis
。riginal)10
California seemed to be in a state of nature , lacking the
restraints of society. The constituted authorities (in
Washington , D.C.) had failed to provide the mechanisms for
instituting civil order. Californians would have to do it
themselves.
They found legitimacy for such an action by the people
in the Declaration of Independence. It was America ’ s
Revolutionary doctrines to which they looked for guidance.
The address indicated how San Franciscans viewed the
?
10
Ibid. , 26 April , 2 , 14 June 1849.
Ibid. , 14 June 1849.
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exercise of popular sovereignty. It noted that there would
probably be widespread apathy surrounding the vote on the
effort to form a government. But this did not matter. All
that mattered was the decision rendered by those who had
actually voted.
If men remain at home and refuse to attend an
election , it is their own fault , and the law
will not presume that they opposed a measure ,
they did ~ot vote against. (emphasis
。rig-inal)11
The words "those who vote" would become interchangeable
with "those who act" for San Franciscans. In San Francisco ,
those who acted and acted effectively , would lay claim to
the revered and powerful mantle of "the people." It
illuminated the essential relationship between effort and
popular sovereignty. The "people" were that portion of the
population who took action.
The city ’ s institutions were imperfectly established ,
and San Franciscans defied them for this very reason. It
was every good citizen ’ s desire , according to the 표A호르 "that
their property and their lives should be placed under the
protection of some settled order of things. ,, 12 The
institutions were too feeble to impose the sort of order
which would give the city a sense of permanency.
Back in the nation ’ s capital the slavery question
seemed to leave Congress hopelessly deadlocked and unlikely
11
12
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Ibid.
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to act to provide California with a civil government. The
admission of California as a state would upset the balance
。f power between the slave states and the free states. This
intransigence led to a call from the Assembly for local
initiative to create such a government.
We have that question to settle for
。urselves; and the sooner we do so the
better. There is nothing to be gained by
delay .... Prompt and determined.ftction will
secure us permanency and peace. 13
In the tumult of gold rush California , patience was not
considered a virtue.
When the Assembly acted to remove the alcalde who was ,
in effect , an official of the military government , General
Riley , the military governor , charged that the assembly had
usurped a power of Congress. The ~녹E효 disagreed in an
editorial entitled , "A Revolution -- Its Progress." The
assembly could not have usurped a power of Congress because
it acted with the endorsement of the people: "this
legislative body was formed by the action of the people of
this District in mass convention assembled." The people
had to act because "there was no other authority to which t。
appeal."14 The message was based directly on the
revolutionary doctrines of the Declaration: California had
no civil order; all authority had reverted to the people.
The editor urged his readers to remember that the
13
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Ibid.
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people had created the assembly because of "a sincere desire
to preserve the lives and property of the community and to
remedy the evils under which they had so long labored." It
had been the inactivity of the military , or "de facto ,"
government that had forced I ’ the community to resort to Lynch
law and such other expedients as the circumstances or
necessities of the case required." The opponents of the
military government did not wish "to overturn the law ," but
。nly "to establish and maintain public order and public
good. ,, 15 This curious hypothesis , that the law must be
defied to preserve order , appeared two years later in the
June of 1851 when organized vigilantes imposed their own
extralegal forms on the city.
About a month after this editorial , the editor
commented on "The End of the Revolution." In response to
General Riley's call for elections for a number of offices
in the San Francisco and San Jose districts , the Assembly
dissolved. But it defiantly asserted its authority had been
legitimate because it had come directly from the people.
They stressed that it was the creation of the Assembly and
its actions that prompted Governor Riley to call for
elections. Without the Assembly the absence of government
would have continued. Extralegal action had been necessary
to compel the government to act. The "revolution" had
ended , said the 욕A호르， because the Assembly nobly stepped
15 Ibid.
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down rather than force a "collision" with the military
government after the call for elections. 16 San
Franciscans , when they became vigilantes in 1851 , recalled
these exact themes.
The circumstances surrounding the legislative assembly
in San Francisco reprised again in the city. The sense that
there were injuries requiring redress brought a portion of
the citizenry to action. The extralegal nature of the
action was justified on the basis of the peculiar
circumstances in California , the exigencies of the
situation , the inaction of the authorities , and the notion
。f Pσpular sovereignty. The lack of strong institutions
provided a context in which the authorities had inadequate
power to resist any sizable collection of men with a
purpose.
Another example of resistance to the constituted
authorities occurred in February 1849. Under the heading ,
"Gross Outrage ," the 표L토르 reported that the alcalde had
issued a warrant for the arrest of a man who had severely
criticized the condition of the jail. The sheriff and his
posse "made forcible arrest ," of the offender , Mr. Everhart.
Upon being brought before the alcalde , Everhart demanded a
trial or a written discharge. When the alcalde refused t。
provide either , Everhart left. Under orders from the
alcalde , the sheriff and his posse chased Everhart , followed
16 Ibid. , 19 , 26 July , 9 August 1849.
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by a crowd of onlookers. Amid the confusion Everhart asked
the crowd for protection.
They responded cheerfully to his call and the
sheriff was quietly , but decidedly informed
that the people would not allow Mr. Everhart
to be imprisoned on such unheard of
pretences , and that they would defend with
their lives , if_pecessary , the sacred liberty
。f the citizen. 17
Everhart was allowed to leave. No action was reported t。
have been taken against the defiant crowd or Everhart. The
institutions of authority , the alcalde and the sheriff , were
not only inadequate to resist the crowd , but were also
unable to enforce their will once the crisis had passed. It
was clear where the real power in San Francisco resided: in
groups of men willing to take a stand.
The residents of San Francisco did not appear to have
any particular regard for officials. The 표It효 wrote
approvingly of this action as having demonstrated ~courage
and decision~ in response to an "extraordinary occasion."
The paper hoped that the same sort of "resistance t。
。ppression and wrong~ could be sustained "until the town of
San Francisco shall be governed by wise laws and worthy
executive officers. "18 Apparently , a determination of the
adequacy of a law and its enforcement could be made in a
spontaneous manner.
17
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THE HOUNDS INCIDENT
In July and August of 1849 San Francisco had an
experience which would provide a direct precedent for later
vigilante activities. A group of men known as the "Hounds"
。r "regulators" became the target of the corrununity ’ s wrath.
The Hounds had initially worked rounding up seamen who had
deserted ship. Shipmasters paid to have their wayward
seamen , who hoped to become miners , returned to them. But
in time the Hounds became bolder and uninhibited. They
apparently strongarmed restaurateurs and barkeepers , and
generally acted as bullies. On a Sunday night they ~’ent on
a rampage in the tent-city on Telegraph Hill inhabited by
Chilean irrunigrants. There a series of robberies , assaults ,
and acts of arson took place. 19
In response , the alcalde made a call for the citizens
to gather , which resulted in the largest public meeting in
San Francisco to that time. 2o A quasi-official force of
230 men then pursued and captured 17 members of the Hounds
and confined them aboard a ship in the harbor.
19 For the Hounds Incident see Roger W. Lotchin , 효르묘
Francisco , 1846-1856: From Hamlet to City (Lincoln , Nebraska
and London: University of Nebraska Press , 1974) , 190-191;
Mary Floyd Williams , Historv of the San Francisco Corrunittee
。f Viailance of 1851 (Berkeley , California: University of
California Press , 1921; reprint , New York: De Capo Press ,
1969) , 105-109; Kevin J. Mullen , Let Justice Be Done: Crime
and Politics in Earlv San Francisc。 (Reno and Las Vegas:
University of Nevada Press ,1989) , 55-61.
20 표lt효， 4 August 1849.
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A trial was arranged which was presided over by three
judges: the alcalde and two men chosen in a public meeting.
The two "citizen-judges" lent a legitimacy to the
proceedings which the alcalde , had he acted alone , would not
have commanded. The extra-legal police force did not
immediately disband. Some men continued to act as a night
patrol. One of the prosecutors , Francis J. Lippitt , spoke
of ’'men giving up their business and industrial pursuits t。
corne forward and see that the wheels of justice are not
impeded. "21 There was no clear-cut distinction between
duly constituted authority and popular authority.
Lippitt charged that the Hounds had committed treason
against the community. "The acts and outrages I allude t。
are the result of a conspiracy -- a systematic attack upon
the lives and property of this community. ,, 22 The charges
。f assault with intent to kill , robbery , and riot were only
。vert manifestations of an underlying and sinister cabal.
The reason for the lesser charges , Lippitt maintained
。minously， was that there were "influential men -- who lean
to the side of the prisoners , and who throw obstacles in the
way of justice."~ Such powerful opposition to social
。rder justified strong action by the community.
Considering the influence of the allies of the Hounds ,
21
22
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the charges that could be legally made against them could
。nly be a rough measure of their transgressions against the
community. The defense claimed that San Francisco lacked
standards of law and thus there were no regulations that
restrained action. Lippitt responded that the Hounds had
acted in defiance of "uniform principles of natural
justice." It was not necessary to have a statute to inform
。rdinary men of these standards of conduct. Such acts of
depravity required "a warning to future transgressors." It
was through a "certainty , not severity of punishment [that]
society [could be] purified of crime."~ Four of the
Hounds were sentenced to prison and three others fined and
ordered "to keep the peace for twelve months. ’, 25 The
sentences could be only imperfectly carried out , partly due
to the lack of a penitentiary.
Roger Lotchin argues that the vigilante actions in the
Hounds affair filled "a legal vacuum."~ The connection t。
later vigilante actions , when a legal mechanism was in
place , is in this regard somewhat tenuous. But there were
important similarities. These were , first , the way in which
citizens were involved in police and judicial activities.
Second was the conception of the offenses as part of a
larger attack on the community , along with the suspicion of
24
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the criminals being connected to powerful elements in the
city. Finally , there was the question of justice , as
。pposed to legal forms , which required immediate action. It
was in this regard a moral , not a political , question.
San Francisco reverted to its usual routine after the
Hounds incident. The volunteer night patrol faded away.
Civic responsibility was something most San Franciscans were
willing to leave to someone else.
AMBIVALENCE TOWARD GOVERNMENT IN SAN FRANCISCO
By October 1849 , the editor of the 표4프르 discerned a
pattern emerging in the city ’ s civic life. He noted that
determined action by the citizenry in creating the
Legislative Assembly had resulted in the town ’ s interests
being "vigilantly guarded." But for want of revenue and
interest from the citizens , the assembly (i.e. the
government) had been unable to prevent or stem the marauding
activities of the Hounds. This episode roused good citizens
from their "lethargic sleep" and they "arose as one man t。
quell tumult , arrest offenders of justice ... and restore
tranquility and law." The editor hoped that a revenue
measure passed , because it would fund government services
that would render it unnecessary for the citizenry t。
personally combat criminals like the Hounds. 27 But in the
27 표A흐르， 4 October 1849.
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absence of such effective government , San Franciscans still
had citizen action as a model of implementing social
control.
The following March (1850) the 표A후르 continued t。
complain about the state of government. While San Francisc。
had grown larger and richer it was still governed in an
uncertain manner. The paper complained that the mixture of
Mexican law and common law was unwieldy and difficult t。
make sense of. Still , much of the blame lay with the town
council and those who had elected them. The people "are
invested with ample powers , if judiciously exercised , t。
work out the greatest good for our suffering
municipality."~ But San Franciscans were not particularly
interested in the everyday business of government.
While commenting on the activities of political parties
in San Francisco the Alta identified the source of this lack
。f interest: the yearning for gold. There would be little
interest in party politics , or any sort of politics , for
that matter , I’ so long as Mammon rules the day. "29 San
Franciscans did not define themselves by their civic
participation. They defined themselves by their individual
interest.
When San Franciscans did participate in politics they
did not do so politely. In response to the perception of
28
29
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high taxes in June of 1850 a group of men amongst those
gathered at Portsmouth Square hissed and groaned at the town
council. The Alta condemned this "a deliberate insult t。
those who had been elected at the ballot box" and called it
the II action of a mob." (emphasis original )30 It was
certainly the former and quite possibly the latter , but it
was how San Franciscans tended to discharge their public
responsibilities.
This same excitement over taxes produced a series of
"indignation meetings." The 표L투효 recognized such assemblies
as a tradition in San Francisco. "Indignation" had been
"frequently manifested in this community , at each political
change in our city affairs." (emphasis original) The editor
assailed these methods as ineffective: "The people have
complained , they have remonstrated , they have assemblec in
indignant mass meeting[s) , and they have resisted ," but they
had not established , or funded , a capable government. 31
This was because they did not really care to do so.
The sporadic character of public life in San Francisc。
resulted from the importance that its residents placed on
it. San Francisco was overwhelmingly composed of young men
hoping to get rich quickly or at least to have a good time.
That there was a real chance to do both made men ’ s
detachment from routine political functions unremarkable.
30
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Most men in San Francisco did not view the mundane work that
was part of conventional politics as profitable or
enjoyable.
San Franciscans had come to view civic responsibility
as episodic in nature. Men were either too busy seeking
wealth to perform civic duties regularly or simply
indifferent. In some ways the spasmodic political life of
San Francisco was not much different from other parts of
America. A mixture of independence and acquisitiveness
disposed Americans to attend to their own affairs at the
expense of community involvement. The heritage of popular
sovereignty and the substantial power it conferred on
individuals , especially as members of a group , gave men a
natural sense of authority. Therefore , it was not
particularly surprising that men could alternate between
apathy and the assuredness of a G끼、 ~~eign. The alternating
indifference and indignation was foreseeable. The residents
。f San Francisco and their compatriots in the mines , stood
in stark contrast to the civic humanist tradition in which
the individual presupposed the community. In CalL:ornia t.uv
community not only presupposed the individual but was
subservient to him.
In San Francisco there was an ambivalence toward the
nascent institutions of government. Though distinct from
the mining regions (and with some pretensions to
superiority) the city could not escape the defining context
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。 f the mines in California. Most Californians lived in the
mining regions and most San Franciscans were headed for ,
coming from , or had been in the mines. Virtually all the
"institutions" of government in the mines were irregular
collections of individuals. It was widely accepted that the
"law of the mines" and extralegal action were appropriate t。
that region. To a large extent San Franciscans had operated
in a similar manner. Institutions of government seemed t。
draw their power mostly from the vacuum left by the absence
。f popular action. Even so , the commercial predisposition
of San Francisco gave rise to a desire among some segments
。f the population for a more regulated and systematic
society than that which existed in the mines.
The demography of San Francisco made this problematic
for the same reasons as it was in the mines. The young male
population was unencumbered by the usu~l foundations of
social order: family , church , employer , and capable
g。、Ternment. San Francisc。 ’ s own experiences had reinforced
an inclination to look outside legally sanctioned modes of
political expression.
Born of and for trade , San Francisco was the
quintessential commercial city. At the same time it
embodied the gold rush with its uncertainty , impermanence ,
and incomparable potential. Most of the men residing in the
city were on their way to or coming from the mines. The
city had something of the character of a huge , but idle ,
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mining camp with a nucleus of settlers: the merchants.
This commercial class in San Francisco was comfortable with
both conventional middle class forms of community building
and the extemporaneous methods that had been improvised in
the mines. Thus political life in the city displayed
aspects of these dissimilar processes of governance. As
concern over crime in the city increased , some San
Franciscans blended these contrasting styles in an effort t。
impose order.
CHAPTER V
SAN FRANCISCO VIGILANTISM: THE EXCITEMENT OF 1851
CRIME IN SAN FRANCISCO
Signs of dissatisfaction abounded in San Francisco as
1851 began. The authorities and courts seemed incapable (or
unwilling) to curb what many perceived to be an escalation
in crime. Fires menaced the city. San Francisco appeared
to be undisciplined and maladministered. The great
commercial city of the Pacific Coast lacked the dignity and
bearing that befitted it. Seeking order , a group of San
Franciscans turned to the means prevalent in the mines for
this task: direct action.
Frustration with the authorities was coupled with a
real increase in crime. While the more expansive claims of
some apologists for the vigilantes , that there had been 100
。r more murders in San Francisco in the year preceding the
committee ’ s formation for instance , are not true , there was
an increase in predatory crime.'
Kevin J. Mullen has documented the reports of criminal
homicide , robbery , and burglary for San Francisco between
’ Kevin J. Mullen , Let Justice Be Done: Crime and
Politics in Earlv San Francisc。 (Reno and Las Vegas:
university of Nevada Press , 1989) , xv-xvi , 26-30.
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July 1849 and December 1852. He found that reports of
criminal homicide rose from three for the first six months
。f 1850 , to thirteen for the second half of the year , and
fell to nine for the first six months of 1851. Robbery
showed a similar trend from two , to eighteen , and back down
to nine. Though both homicide and robbery fell in the first
half of 1851 both were still at levels far higher than they
had been a year earlier. Burglary , however , rose
precipitously from four in the first half of 1850 , to forty-
nine in the second half of the year , and fifty-three t。
start out 1851. 2
Burglary was insidiou8 because it was not as easy t。
avoid as many other crimes. Keeping respectable company and
avoiding saloons and games of chance drastically lowered
。ne ’ s chances of becoming a victim of violent crime. But
peaceable citizens , especially those who had achieved
material success , were likely targets for burglars.
Therefore , the increase in burglary is important in
understanding the threat of crime felt by the middle class
citizenry of San Francisco. The 표It효 reported that chicken
stealing had become common during the winter of 1850-51. 3
Minor crimes like chicken stealing might not endanger lives ,
but they did widen the circle of those affected by crime and
magnified the sensation that crime was out of control.
2
3
Ibid. , 110 , 127 , 128 , 129-130 , 216 , 228-230.
Alta California (San Francisco) , 15 February 1851.
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In a similar vein , Bryan White has compiled figures
regarding cases before the Recorder ’ s Court in San Francisc。
for 1851. The Recorder heard civil cases that involved
amounts of less than $500 , held initial hearings on some
criminal cases , and decided whether these should be referred
to a higher court. Its jurisdiction also covered city
。rdinance violations , such as drunkenness or disorderly
conduct. As such , the Recorder ’ s ledger serves as a history
。f the enforcement of middle class values of sobriety and
civil behavior. It also documents the kinds of crimes ~hat
were likely to affect ordinary people. White found that the
reported crimes per month increased nearly 55 percent from
January to February 1851. The rate remained high (relative
to January) through July. In light of these figures it
could be expected that many San Franciscans felt their city
lacked order. 4
For citizens who longed for San Francisco to be an
。rderly city inhabited by individuals who exhibited self-
control , the beginning of 1851 imperiled their vision.
Instead of becoming more settled, the city seemed to be
slipping into an abyss of debauchery. The rowdiness and
aggressiveness that characterized gold rush society seemed
to be triumphing over moderation. Frightened by the
prospect that San Francis~o’ s condition could become an
4 Bryan White , "Crime in San Francisco , 1851 ,"
(unpublished research paper , Portland State University ,
n.d.) , passim.
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incorrigibly dissolute , the city's middle class hoped t。
reform the city in conformity with their aspirations for a
disciplined , restrained city where commerce and conventional
social forms could flourish.
THE JANSEN AFFAIR
San Francisc。’ s middle class felt especially endangered
in February 1851 , after a respected merchant , C. J. Jansen ,
was robbed and seriously injured in his store. Two men were
arrested. A conflict quickly escalated between a crowd , wh。
wished to hang the accused or try them themselves , and the
authorities , who were determined to see the legal process
through. Ultimately a court , the officers and jury of which
were chosen by the assembled men , tried the pair , but they
failed to reach a definite verdict. After the verdict the
disappointed crowd made several attempts to seize the
prisoners. The police , with the help of 250 volunteers ,
turned back these efforts. Eventually the prisoners , Robert
Windred and James Stuart (really Thomas Berdue) , were turned
。ver to the authorities , tried and sentenced to prison.
Although the Jansen affair did not lead to the immediate
formation of the vigilance committee , it was a direct
antecedent. 5
5 On the Jansen incident see Mullen 123-128; Mary
Floyd Williams , Hi~~orv of the San Francisco Committee of
Viailance of 1851 (Berkeley , California: University of
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The 표A후르 took the opportunity provided by the Jansen
excitement to contrast the effectiveness of the summary
methods of the mines against the worthless legal machinery
。f San Francisco. In the mines , the newspaper
editorialized , a criminal
usually receives a short shrift and a long
rope , or stripes upon his back sufficient t。
remain as a lasting memento of summary
justice. In San Francisco , however , it has
become almost proverbial that there is n。
punishment for crim~， no legal protection for
peaceable citizens.。
The 묘It르 compared the courts with a British ministry
which had just been given a vote of no confidence by the
people ’ s reaction during the Jansen affair. The action of
the people had been a clear manifestation of their wishes.
The people , outraged beyond endurance , have
calmly, not with riot , denounced the pseud。
embodiments of law and order , called
administrators of justice. There is now not
。ne particle 。좋 respect felt for the officers
。f the courts. (
It was hoped that an "assemblage of five thousand citizens"
would induce the courts to more energetic punishment of
criminals. 8 The 표A흐르 reported that it had received
California Press , 1921; reprint , New York: De Capo Press ,
1969) , 170-176; Robert M. Senkewicz , Viailantes in Gold Rush
San Francisc。 (Stanford , California: Stanford University
Press , 1985) , 2-4.
6
7
8
Alt르， 21 February 1851.
Ibid. , 24 February 1851.
Ibid. , 23 February 1851.
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l ’ numerous" letters from citizens who insisted the
authorities step aside if they would not put a check upon
crime. The writers suggested direct public action to make
an example that would address the problem of crime. 9 It
did not seem to matter that it was not a regular court , but
a popularly selected court , that had failed to convict the
men suspected of the Jansen robbery.
The Jansen affair exposed an ambivalence in the public
mind regarding the administration of justice in San
Francisco. On one hand , the example and personal experience
many San Franciscans had of the mines led them to endorse
the abrupt and popularly driven methods of social control
practiced there. But doubts about the appropriateness of
lynch law to San Francisco worried residents as well. San
Franciscans were torn between the ethos of gold rush
California and their image of themselves as inhabitants of a
great city where the roughness of the mines did not belong.
THE CHAIN GANG
After the excitement surrounding the Jansen affair had
died down the Alta undertook a new crusade: the
establishment of a chain gang. It was , argued the editor , a
mode of punishment befitting a settled city. Criminals
would be forced to toil and thus c。πpelled to meet the
9 Ibid. , 21 February 1851.
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middle class expectation of an industrious citizenry.
Similarly , the 욕A흐르 had called for a vagrant law. • o The
chain gang was the ultimate middle class punishment.
Laziness was considered a chief characteristic of criminals.
Confinement was hardly punishment to these laggards. They
were able to lounge all day and were provided with food and
shelter. The criminals ’ “ horror of hard work" made the
chain gang the "most severe punishment" imaginable. Should
inmates refuse to work , "apply the lash or starvation. "11
The city council approved a chain gang during the Jansen
excitement. But it turned out that the council did not have
the authority to institute such punishment. The Court of
Sessions did , however , and obliged by establishing a chain
12gang.
The 표A후르 found that the chain gang helped in
"restraining crime ," more so "than would one or tw。
executions."13 The paper also credited the public
demonstrations during the Jansen affair with having a
similar effect. The approbation for the chain gang and the
approval of the near-lynching of the men accused of the
Jansen robbery illustrated the duality in the Al후르;흐 and San
Francisc。’ s thinking about criminal justice. The chain gang
10 Ibid. , 5 January 1851.
11 Ibid. , 11 March , 25 Feb 1851.
12 Ibid. , 27 February 1851.
13 Ibid. , 10 April 1851.
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embodied middle class expectations of order and industry ‘
Lynching seemed to be the abandonment of them. In gold rush
California , however , lynching could also be very middle
class.
The contention that crime had decreased was borne out
뇨y 칸1ullen’ s research for robbery and murder , but not for
burglary. Still missing in the minds of many San
Franciscans were a satisfactorily speedy system of
adjudication and visibly effective punishment of those
convicted. "Let us but have a system of quick adjudication
in criminal trials and an additional security will be
。btained，" averred the 효It르 .14 The proponents of civil
。rder felt improvements had been made but were not satisfied
that the authorities were energetic enough to enforce order.
JAIL BREAKS AND FIRES
Potential vigilante leaders gained a level of
confidence due to the fairly successful resistance of the
crowd to the authorities during the Jansen affair. The
institution of the chain gang was a victory for middle class
values. But if these events gave heart to the merchants ,
they were alarmed by a number of escapes from the city jail ,
a series of fires (which they perceived to be caused by
arson) , and the relatively high rate of burglary.
14 Ibid.
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Between April 9 , and June 3 , 1851 there were seven
separate escapes from the city jail and another attempt
(which the police thwarted) , or a rate of about one escape
every week. At least 37 prisoners escaped during these jail
breaks. Throughout the 욕It효 wondered how the prisoners
obtained tools to break out of jail and how the escapes were
effected when several police officers were supposedly
guarding the prisoners. (In the wake of the escape on May
9, four officers were fired for negligence.) A criminal ’ s
"safest and cheapest course" when arrested , claimed the
표A투효， was to be convicted and sent to jail from which he
could easily abscond. The 효It르 grumbled that "there seems
no hope of punishment." The paper also demanded that the
partially built jail be completed. The escapes and the lack
。f an adequate jail led the 표녹후르 to the conclusion that "the
branches of government , judicial , aldermanic , and pOlice a~e
all of a piece -- just good for nothing."15 San
Franciscans ’ most readily available alternative to their
supposedly worthless government were the methods employed in
the mines.
In 1849 and 1850 San Francisco experienced three
disastrous fires. 16 Each of them destroyed large parts of
the city. Fire was a common danger in the nation ’ s urban
15 Ibid. , 9 , 24 April , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 7 , 9 , 10 , 14 , 20 ,
26 , 31 May , 3 , 6 , 7 June 1851.
16 Lotchin , 174-175.
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areas during the nineteenth century. San Francisco , built
。f wood and lacking a water system equal to the task of
fighting fires , was particularly vulnerable to ruinous
fires. The city's residents were understandably sensitive
to the destruction fire could bring. Historians have
discounted arson as the cause of most of the city ’ s great
fires. But for many San Franciscans it was an article of
faith that arsonists set the fires that laid waste to large
parts of the city. 17
The incendiary was among the most sinister images a San
Franciscan could con그 ure in his mind. The 욕L후효 found it
"difficult to conceive of the utter moral prostration of the
human mind which must exist in the incendiary." It was a
desire for gain , theft committed in the confusion of the
fire , that supposedly actuated the incendiary. The arsonist
and his confederates , it was believed , operated in organized
gangs , setting fires that they might reap their bounty while
honest men fought the blaze. The death penalty was
considered appropriate for such crimes. 18
The day before the Jansen robbery a fire was discovered
and extinguished. The 관lt르 thought it was "undoubtedly" the
result of arson.껴 Then , in early May , the fourth great
fire ravaged San Francisco. perhaps as much as one-fourth
17 Senkewicz , 72-75; Mullen , 83; Lotchin , 176-177.
18 표lt효， 24 January 1850.
19 Ibid. , 20 February 1851.
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the city and three-quarters of the business district were
destroyed. Between 20 and 100 people died. 20 Many were
burnt out of their businesses. In addition to the losses
stemming from the fire itself , "crime seemed to run riot
throughout the city. ,, 21 Initially the fire was attributed
to an accident. But shortly the 표후프르그효 contention that the
fire had been set "by an incarnate fiend for the purpose of
robbery" gained credence.~ The horrible effects of the
fire were an understandable cause of consternation amongst
the city ’ s residents.
In mid-May two more "attempts" to set fires were
reported , one being aimed at the city hospital. "This
attempt to fire the city seems to now be of nightly
occurrence ," the 욕L호효 complained. 23 Two more "attempts t。
fire the city ," were controlled in early June.~
The monstrous menace that fire posed to the city's
well-being (and even its existence) , the perceived incidence
of crime , and the sense that both were being orchestrated by
a class or organization of criminals make understandable the
urgency felt by San Franciscans. They were exasperated by
authorities who seemed incapable of remedying the situation.
20 Lotchin , 175; Mullen , 141.
21 Alta , 5 May 1851.
22 Mullen , 141; 효L후르， 9 May 1851.
23 Alta , 16 , 17 May 1851.
24 Ibid. , 1 , 4 June 1851.
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Hopes that San Francisco could be a peaceful , commercial
city seemed to be slipping away.
By mid-May the supposed efforts of this criminal
element to burn down the city "show plainly that some more
extensive and efficient mode m~st be adopted to secure" the
city from further fires and crime. A "large portion" of the
police , the 좌L후르 charged , "offer a protection to , rather
than a check upon the disorderly and vicious." In light of
this the only answer to these threats to the city was "a
volunteer police."~
A volunteer night patrol was formed. The group was led
by prominent merchant F.W. Macondray and received the
。fficial sanction of the city government. It had about 100
members who patrolled the streets. The volunteer police
were authorized by a city ordinance and its officers sworn
in by the mayor. George Schenck , one of the volunteer
policemen and later a vigilante , said the patrol "may be
said to be the origin of the Vigilance Committee of 1851."
Mary Floyd Williams said this was "not exactly substantiated
by other accounts , but it indicates one of the influences
which led to the formation of the Committee of Vigilance."
Not surprisingly , many of the volunteer policemen became
vigilantes. 26 The volunteer patrols apparently continued
into July , but the extent of their activities was not
25 Ibid. , 19 May 1851.
26 Williams , 180-181; Al죠르， 19 , 20 May 1851.
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reported in the 효A호르. What association it may have had with
the vigilance committee , if any , is not known. 27 Its
sanction by the authorities demonstrated a congeniality t。
(or an inability to resist) citizen involvement in law
enforcement in San Francisco.
OUTRAGE
Despite this apparent congeniality between the citizens
and the authorities of the city , events were coming to a
head. On June 2 , an Australian immigrant , Benjamin Lewis ,
set fire to a boarding house after being evicted and was
arrested for arson. During a hearing he was nearly lynched
in court after a false alarm of fire. Later , the unpopular
Judge Levi Parsons quashed the indictment against Lewis on
the grounds that the grand jury had been illegally
convened ‘ 28 Another Australian caught burglarizing a store
was nearly hung by a crowd before they relinquished him t。
27 욕A후르， 14 , 20 , 22 , 25 , 26 June , 11 July 1851.
28 Judge Parsons had aroused popular indignation with
his treatment of newspaper editor William Walker and by
instructing the grand jury not to return indictments except
when the evidence was strong enough to bring a conviction in
a jury trial. The San Francisc。 턴르E르A브 (Walker ’ s paper)
charged that this was tantamount to instructing the grand
jury "to aid the escape of criminals." Parsons ’ s action
。nly hardened the beliefs of those who suspected the
authorities lacked th응 desire to fight crime. Supra , chapter
3, 85-86; Williams , 177.
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the custody of the police.~ On June 6, the 관L후르 reported
that Marshal Crozier closed police records to the press. 3D
Two days later a communication was printed in the 표A호르
from "Justice ," purported to be from "one of our most
respectable firms." I’Justice" called for the formation of
two committees. A "committee of safety" would board ships
that hailed from the British penal colonies to ensure that
。nly "respectable and honest men" disembarked. A "committee
。f vigilance" would locate criminals still in the city and
give them five days to leave. A "war of extermination"
would be undertaken against those who remained. The 밑추프르
approved of these suggestions and remarked that no one n응ed
be injured or killed; undesirables need only stay out of San
Francisco. 31
If such action seemed illegal or insurrectionary the
Alt효 reminded its readers that the people "are the original
source of power. They are the law." Written laws were only
an "expression of their will" and could be changed or
discarded when the authorities failed to protect the
people. 32 This was powerful testimony to a sense of
popular sovereignty.
On June 8, another fire was contained. The 표It르 found
29 Mullen , 146.
30 Alta , 6 June 1851.
31 Ibid. , 8 June 1851.
32 Ibid.
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in it an ominous lesson: "This could not possibly have been
the result of accident and it is rendered positive and
beyond a doubt , that there is in this city an organized band
。 f villains who are determined to destroy the city." The
problem of crime had been "talked and written and thought"
about long enough , lectured the 욕4후르. "Let a public meeting
be called immediately , and let some simple but determined
plan of action be agreed upon , by which we may rid ourselves
。f the incendiaries and burglars who infest our city. 펴3
The Alta chided San Franciscans for their lack of action.
"We doubt if there is spirit or public spirit enough among
。ur people to even reprimand one of these throat slashers ,
were he caught in the act of strangling a child or setting
fire to a church." The authorities had failed and needed
direction from the people , wrote the 욕J호효;흐 editor. "There
is something needed on the part of the people. They must
give tone to the action of the courts , and must show and
exercise some interest in the public welfare."~ Somehow,
the summary methods of mining justice ought to be used t。
invigorate the conventional modes of social control in the
city.
Shortly after two 。’ clock the next morning a Sydney
immigrant , John Jenkins , was dead , hanging by his neck from
the gable of the old adobe customs house in Portsmouth
33
34
Ibid. , 9 June 1851.
Ibid. , 10 June 1851.
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Square. The popular temper had boiled over. The people had
shown the courts what to do.
Jenkins had been caught spiriting a stro r.gbox from the
rooms of a merchant. Instead of delivering him to the
police , his captors took him to the rooms of the newly
formed Committee of Vigilance. The prearranged signal t。
summon the committee , two tolls of the city ’ s fire bells at
。ne minute intervals , was made. Committeemen , armed with a
prearranged password , gained entrance to the building. As
word of the Jenkins "arrest" spread , spectators filled the
streets. After a secret trial , Jenkins , reputed to be an
ex-convict and hardened criminal , was sentenced to death.
(A sentence of death for grand larceny was an option
available to juries in California at this time.)
An armed guard of vigilantes marched the condemned man
through the streets to his execution. Attempts to rescue
Jenkins , by his friends and the police , were forcibly
resisted. Among the crowd that witnessed the hanging
perhaps as much as a third of those present opposed it
according to Ira Cole , an opponent of the vigilance
committee. But a clear majority of the crowd approved of
the execution. 35
In juxtaposition to the gravity of the hanging , the
activity in the nearby gambling halls and saloons went on.
35 Williams , 215. Cole later attacked a member of the
committee , see Williams , 321. On the Jenkins hanging see
Williams , 208-217; Mullen , 158-166; Senkewicz , 4-5 , 83-84.
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One witness related how he and his companion , unsure whether
a hanging would actually take place , debated whether to g。
eat or wait for the possible execution: "so we argued the
case -- oysters vs. Hanging -- and after an able discussion
。n both sides , Hanging got a verdict in his favor."~
Apparently , lynching was not out of place in San Francisco.
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE VIGILANCE COMMITTEE
In the next few days the 좌도후효 discussed the actions of
the committee as earnest exhibitions on the part of
reflective , public-spirited men. It applauded the "calmness
and deliberation" that had characterized the committee ’ s
work. 37 But the informality with which the event was
regarded by some of the crowd revealed an aspect of popular
justice that worried the 좌추후르， and even some of the
vigilantes. Mass public demonstrations , without the sage
guidance of the city ’ s best men , could easily degenerate
into mob action and disorder. Curiously , the paper was able
to conceive of the will of I’ the people" and the leadership
and action of "the few" as compatible concepts. The
language of liberal majoritarianism was colored by classical
rhetoric regarding capable , elite leadership. Vigilantism
36 Marvsville (California) Herald , 14 June 1851.
37 표L프효， 12 June 1851.
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was a fearsome assertion of the popular will. It implied an
uncontrollable power , the perilous essence of popular
sovereignty.
The edition of the 관4프르 which appeared on the day of
Jenkins's hanging (and which had been written before the
hanging took place) reported the formation of a "secret
organization ," the vigilance committee. It reflected on
past attempts at lynching in San Francisco calling them
"extremely farcical." However , the incidents poJ.nted t。
"the existence of a spirit that cannot much longer be
smothered and subdued." This desire to wreak vengeance on
criminals "will break out ere long, and woe unto those wh。
provoke it." This spirit , when it found expression in a
leaderless mob , was weak and easily quelled. But with
。rganization and leadership , "the next affair of this kind
will be of a different character. ’I~ Popular expression
required able leadership to implement its will. The
question for the 표A후효 seemed to be whether , once awakened ,
this spirit could be contained.
Initially , the committee was a secret organization. In
the wake of the Jenkins hanging , however , its membership
became more or less public knowledge. And membership was
considered a badge of honor. The coroner ’ s jury
investigating Jenkins ’ s death found that he had met his
demise at the hands of "an association of citizens , styling
38 Ibid. , 11 June 1851.
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themselves a Committee of Vigilance. ,, 39 Nine vigilantes
were named by the coroner ’ s jury. The next day 180 members
。f the committee signed a communication to the city's
newspapers claiming responsibility equal to those named by
the coroner ’ s jury. 때
"The authorities are placed in a very serious dilemma ,"
。pined the 표A후르. It was clear that the vigilantes had
broken the law , but the prosecution of those named by the
coroner ’ s jury would result in "nothing less than riot and
bloodshed. “’1 The authorities had brought the difficult
situation on themselves by failing to protect the public
from dangerous criminals: "the people were compelled for the
safety of their lives and the protection of their property ,
to take the law into their own hands , and mete out a
terrific punishment to the guilty."~
Yet , while the 표후호르 spoke of the action of "the people"
it recognized that it was really the act of the vigilance
committee. It was not yet clear that the vigilantes had
been sanctioned by the people: "It seems to have become a
question as to whether they will or will not be sustained by
the community. ,, 43
39 Quoted in Williams , 216.
40 Ibid. , 216-217.
41 Alta , 12 June 1851.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid. , 13 June 1851.
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Although the Al흐르 seemed to insist on a popular
sanction for the vigilance committee , it equivocated on the
subject of popular action. Recognizing that "sage and
lengthy" arguments had been made against an assumption of
power by a gro~p of men , the 표lt르 replied that it was a
"well known fact that nothing can be accomplished by a
movement of the mass." Efficiency demanded that the
enforcement of the law be undertaken by "the few ," either
the regular authorities or the vigilance committee.« The
vigilance committee ’ s legitimacy was defended by the 표4후효
and others on the basis of its being composed of the best or
leading men of the city. At the same time the 표lt효
continued to insist that the actions of the vigilance
committee were the expression of the will of the citizenry.
When the authorities fail to protect the public "the people
are compelled to take upon themselves the duty of self
preservation." The "community must preserve and defend
itself. ’, 45
The vigilantes were the agents of the community ,
preserving and defending it. The people's role was to
validate the actions of the vigilantes. The notion of
popular sovereignty championed by the supporters of the
vigilance committee in San Francisco was not a pure and
unmediated one. There was something dangerous and untamed
«
45
Ibid.
Ibid. , 14 June 1851.
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about authority which flowed from and was physically enacted
by the people without the "filter" of worthy men , elected or
self-appointed. Even in egalitarian gold rush San Francisc。
the American belief that some men are better suited than
others to lead ran deep.
Following the hanging of Jenkins the 표추후르 felt
compelled to justify it not to Californians (who presumably
understood the necessity of such methods) , but to the
residents of the East Coast. The paper worried that
Easterners would not understand the unique circumstances
(the "evils") which were present in California and thus made
summary justice imperative.~ This need to explain and
justify vigilantism illustrates the doubts that some San
Franciscans felt about the hanging. Lynch law seemed
natural in the context of the mines (and this context
heavily influenced San Francisco) , but there was a certain
level of discomfort , behind all the brave talk , that such
methods were being employed in their "emporium of the
Pacific."
In an attempt to justify the employment of vigilantism
in San Francisco the Alta editorialized on the conditions
that had brought it about. California had experienced an
extraordinarily large and heterogeneous immigration , which
included a large number of "the most daring , depraved and
reckless men." For some time Congress failed to extend
~ Ibid.
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civil government to California , leaving it in a state
"nearly bordering on anarchy." When civil government was
instituted it proved to be incompetent and corrupt ,
particularly in the area of criminal justice. The police
and the courts were either inept or in collusion with ~he
criminal element. Prisons offered little resistance t。
convicts wishing to escape. The "whole machinery of
government" was a complete failure. 47
The 표A후르 then addressed five objections which had been
raised regarding the vigilance committee ’ s handling of the
~~nkins case. The paper ’ s reasoning illuminates many of the
assumptions of , and rationale for , the committee. First ,
why had Jenkins not been turned over the authorities?
Because "experience had conclusively demonstrated" that even
if Jenkins were tried and convicted he would "easily escape
punishment." Second , why was the trial conducted in secret?
"Because if good were to be accomplished , it could only be
accomplished by the few. If the multitude were
participants , nothing but confusion , disorder , and
irresolution would result." Third , why was the death
penalty imposed? "Because it was honestly believed that
such action was necessary for the purpose of intimidating
and restraining other offenders." Fourth , why was there n。
delay in carrying out the sentence , especially considering
the late hour? Because it was the most effective way t。
47 Ibid.
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give the punishment meaning in the same way that made the
death penalty necessary. Fifth , How would the community
benefit from "this revolutionary assumption of arbitrary
power?" By establishing safety of life aad property.
This exposition by the 욕후ζ르 is striking for its
rejection of popular principles. Yet in the same editorial
it was "the people" who had enforced ’'punishment for crime
without due process of law ," and thus committed treason. It
was an act of self-preservation; a "justifiable
revolution."~ It was the penultimate act of popular
sovereignty: government had been superseded, but not
。verturned.
The question of whether this revolution was a mass
movement , or an action of the few , was left unresolved. The
difficulty the 좌It효 had in clarifying the nature of the
insurgency reflected the fundamental murkiness of popular
action. A significant number , but not a majority , of the
city's residents had seen the hanging. But clearly , the
bulk of San Francisc。’ s population had not had a hand in the
actions of the vigilance committee. How could the "will" of
the people be ascertained regarding the hanging? In an
absolute sense the people ’ s will could not be ascertained
and never can be; the subtlety of each individual ’ s opinion
cannot be measured. A society ’ s acceptance of popular
sovereignty does allow for some rough measure of the
~ Ibid.
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people's will to be made. And this was what the Al후르 was
getting at when it wondered whether the committee would be
"sustained by the community. “ 9 Voting might be one way t。
measure the people ’ s will , but successful action was the
definitive measure.
The provocative language of the 표L후르， approving of
insurrection , is especially enlightening when juxtaposed
against its editorial comments a few days later. As many of
the city ’ s leading merchants were in open rebellion against
the constituted authorities , the 욕It르 wrote favorably about
the "changed and improved" condition of society. These
changes had nothing to do with the vigilance committee , but
rather were attributable to social betterment. Families ,
women , and churches had increased in number while gambling
and recklessness had diminished among the general population
(i.e. not including the criminal element). The lack of
literary and educational opportunities , however , were still
glaring deficiencies in San Francisco. Intellectual ,
social , moral , and religious influences were the keys t。
building an orderly community. "Intellectual culture is a
far better law maker than the politician , and any method
which can set men to thinking upon worthy subjects , is far
better than the statute which punishes for crimes
committed. ,, 50 The vigilance committee was a drastic and
49
50
Ibid. , 13 June 1851.
Ibid. , 18 June 1851.
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active method in attempting to achieve social order , but
these other , subtler movements were also important.
In the next column the paper reflected on the methods ,
legal or otherwise , necessary to battle crime. "The times
in which we must act do not admit of the consideration of
abstract questions of legality."51 The following day the
Al드르 lauded the "astonishing diminution of crime among us in
the past week" and attributed it to the danger the vigilance
committee posed to criminals. 52
At first glance there might seem to be a contradiction
between the Alta ’ s endorsement of both moral instruction and
illegal hangings. But both were part of changes that were
taking place in San Francisco. The values of a middle class
commercial society were colliding with those of the
California mining society. San Francisco was suffering from
a sort of identity crisis. It was part commercial emporium,
eager for the settled ways friendly to business and
community growth. But a volatile mass of men interested
mainly , if not solely , in sudden riches converged in the
city. San Francisco was at once a giant mining camp with a
mass of temporary residents and a great metropolis that
faced the challenge of maintaining the deportment of a
notable and distinguished city.
Merchants found encouragement for a conventional
51
52
Ibid.
Ibid. , 19 June 1851.
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lifestyle with the growing presence of families and churches
that supplemented their bourgeois enterprise. Yet the city
remained predominately male and transient. Middle class
values could hardly seem safe among rootless and rowdy
adventurers. Different modes of social domination , some of
which appealed to conventional , middle class sensibilities ,
and some of which were less refined , were evidenced in San
Francisco.
The merchants perceived that there was a shameless
criminal element (a perception supported by the increase in
reported crime) that the authorities were unwilling or
unable to effectively punish or control. This criminal
element presented an obvious threat to order and appeared t。
be incorrigible. While the city ’ s temporary residents were
not a stable foundation on which to build a middle class
city , they could be enlisted to fight its most obvious
menace. The men going to and corning from the mines and the
merchants shared an affinity for material security. Fortune
hunters desired safety for their fortune or potential
fortune. Pity for thieves and robbers was non-existent in
San Francisco. The lines that separated the merchant class
and the mining class were blurry at best. The desire for
。rder (a typically middle class impulse) collided with the
mining camp atmosphere created by the impermanence of the
city ’ s population. The collision of middle class and mi41ng
cultures resulted in systematic and relatively moderate
143
vigilante action.
The committee was organized under a constitution. An
executive committee made most of the decisions but some were
submitted to the general membership for approval. Hubert
Howe Bancroft maintained that "all power was lodged" with
the executive committee and that it gave "all orders. ,, 53
The city was divided into districts and patrolled by a
police force of about 100 men directed by a chief of police
and five deputy marshals. A separate force , the water
police , kept an eye on the activities in the bay and its
environs. The headquarters of the committee were manned
around the clock , always ready to receive information about
suspicious goings-on and , if necessary , summon the
committee. At its height the committee counted 707 members.
Members also "carefully watched" various trials , an activity
that Williams dubbed "supervision."~
During the approximately three months the committee was
active it arrested 91 persons. Of these four were hanged ,
。ne whipped , fourteen deported with their passage paid by
the committee , fourteen more ordered to leave (threatened
with execution if they failed to do so) , fifteen turned over
to the authorities , and forty-one discharged (two were
unaccounted for and Williams suspected they were discharged
53 Hubert Howe Bancroft , The Works of Hubert Howe
Bancroft , vo l. 36 , PODular Tribunals , vol. 1, (San
Francisco: The History Company Publishers , 1887) , 240.
54 Mullen 170-171; Williams , 222-226 , 320 , 289.
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as well). The water police examined 495 arrivals. Twenty-
five of these were suspected to be ex-convicts , but only
seven were sent back to Sydney.55 The committee ’ s
activities hardly resembled the "war of extermination ‘’
against criminals that the Alt효;흐 correspondent "Justice"
had threatened in early June. 56 Most of those charged with
crimes punishable by death under California law were turned
。ver the authorities.
The four hangings were the focal points of the
committee ’ s operation. The Jenkins hanging was a
spontaneous act: he was caught , tried , sentenced , and
executed within hours. In this way it differed from the
subsequent hangings , which were premeditated. But like the
。ther hangings the vigilantes and their supporters insisted
that it was "the present state of municipal affairs [which]
demanded the assumption of power. ,, 57 It was the feebleness
。r corruption of the authorities that made vigilantism
necessary.
In the wake of the Jenkins hanging the Alt효 found
reason for optimism. The Recorder ’ s Court lacked the "vast
numbers" of burglary and larceny cases which had formerly
clogged it. Additionally no prisoners were attempting t。
escape from jail. These happy developments were traced t。
55 Williams , 361-362 , 236.
56 욕과효， 8 June 1851.
57 Ibid. , 12 June 1851.
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the criminal element's fear of the vigilance committee. 58
Two days later the 표4프효 cited the opinion of an "old
policeman" that the most important factor in the
"astonishing diminution of cases" before the Recorder was
the enforcement of the midnight closing law on
establishments that served alcohol. The closures deprived
criminals of "rendezvous from which to sally forth and
commit robbery or murder." "There is no doubt ," asserted
the 표후후르， "that enforcement of the ordinance in this matter
has had a very beneficial effect." The Recorder deserved
"great credit" for his part in it.~ During July the 좌4드효
expressed alarm at the "enormous quantity of small
groggeries" which produced their own "Jersey lightnin ’ · ” 6O
In August the Board of Aldermen passed an ordinance that
allowed establishments that posted a $10 ,000 bond to stay
。pen past midnight. The 표It르 complained that this was a
"step backward. ,, 61 Enforced moderation in the consumption
。f alcohol was another imposition of middle class
expectations which paralleled , and complemented , the work of
the vigilance committee.
Bryan White found that the Recorder heard 22 cases for
alcohol violations during the first four months of 1851 , but
58 Ibid. , 19 June 1851.
59 Ibid. , 21 June 1851.
60 Ibid. , 18 June 1851.
61 Ibid. , 16 August 1851.
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that the figure jumped to 53 for May , then dropped off
slightly to 44 for June , 42 for July , and 39 for August.
The number of cases then rose again to 45 in September , 55
in October , and 65 and 61 in November and December. 62
Alcohol enforcement was steady and reflected an emerging
attitude which did not countenance drunken carousing.
Sobriety was a middle class virtue and the 욕L후효;흐
concerns about alcohol reflected an interest in changing San
Francisco into a more civilized community. It saw better
restaurants and hotels as one means to this end. Businesses
that were "more reconciled to sociable and refined pursuits
of pleasure , and the habits of life as they maintain
elsewhere , than to the reckless , drifting , temporary nature
。f our present-day existence" would make San Francisco a
better place. It was up to the city ’ s residents t。
eradicate dissipation: "By our loose -- immoral --
alienations from enlightened manners and customs as a
community , we encourage vice and create a broad field for
the spread of every species of immorality. "63 Though this
call for cultivation seems far removed from extralegal
hangings , it was part of the same impulse to impose social
control. Prior to each of the vigilantes ’ next tw。
hangings , the Al흐르 called for restraint on the part of the
committee. Alcohol consumption , dining , and vigilantism all
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required a level of discipline and moderation. Discipline
and moderation reflected bourgeois expectations. San
Francisc。’ s future as a settled , commercial city depended
upon propriety in its public behavior.
JAMES STUART
James Stuart had been convicted of the notorious Jansen
robbery in February and now was standing trial in Marysville
for murder. On July 1, a prisoner suspected of stealing a
trunk was brought to the committee rooms. The next morning
John Sullivan carne to take his turn at guard duty and
identified the suspect as James Stuart. As it turned out ,
the man in Marysville who had been convicted of the Jansen
robbery was an innocent man , Thomas Berdue , not Stuart.
The night of July 8, Stuart began writing a lengthy
confession. It detailed a long criminal career and
implicated a number of people , including the port warden and
some police officers. Meanwhile the city attorney , Frank
Pixley , who had defended Stuart previously and had insisted
in February that the suspect in custody (Thomas Berdue) was
not Stuart , obtained a writ of habeas corpus ordering the
committee to turn over their prisoner (the actual
Stuart) .64
The Al프르 counseled the vigilantes to turn Stuart over
64 Williams , 252-253; Mullen , 179-181.
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to the authorities: "An order issued out of the highest
Court of the state is entitled to respect , and the
disobedience of it would be a dangerous precedent t。
establish." The paper expressed confidence that Stuart
would be justly punished by the courts because "the action
of the Committee has already incited the Courts to a
performance of their duty" in other cases. It was "better
to yield in this case an obedience to the law , and then see
that the law in the punishment of Stuart , if found guilty ,
be strictly enforced. ,, 65 The Al후효 suggested that there
were appropriate limits to vigilantism, even that which was
under the direction of the most respectable members of the
community.
The vigilantes shuttled Stuart between several hiding
places (including a city alderman ’ s house) and prevented the
sheriff from executing the writ. It was not to be the last
time the committee defied such a writ. In five other cases
it refused to turn prisoners over to the authorities.~
Stuart accused Pixley of having permitted perjured
testimony to be presented on his behalf in his trials for
larceny in Sacramento. He also charged the attorney with
the appropriation of $500. Pixley angrily denied the
charges. The committee never took action against Pixley ,
。ne of their most persistent critics. Their open defiance
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。f the authorities did not extend to personal confrontations
with the officials themselves. For revolutionaries the
vigilantes seemed careful not to disturb the men who ran the
machinery of government.~
On July 11 , Stuart was hanged by the committee. The
효lt르 reported it as “ The Tragedy of Yesterday." The
report ’ s description of the events again did not distinguish
between the hanging as an action of the community or the
action of a select few: "Once more have the people of San
Francisco risen in their awful majesty to visit upon a
guilty man the punishment due to his cr5mes." But it was
the vigilance committee which had been "compelled ... t。
take the law into their own hands , and protect the lives ,
property , and families of their defenceless fellow
citizens." By hanging Stuart "the Committee of Vigilance
have [sic] discharged this duty to the community."68
The 표lt르 ardently supported the committee ’ s punishment
of "known and confessed criminals ," but at the same time was
anxious that it act with restraint. The committee had been
"sustained by the great majority" of the community; it was
"deliberate and just ," punished "only the guilty ," and had
studiously avoided a "direct collision with the legally
constituted authorities. "69 How quickly the Al후효 forgot
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its admonishments regarding the writ of habeas corpus.
Still , the 건L후효 "deeply deplored" the hanging , while
acknowledging it was necessary , and the committee itself was
said to "deeply regret the necessity" of the hanging. M
The editor ’ s uncertainty as to how to respond to the actions
。f the committee is striking.
The 욕It효 seemed intent on convincing itself that the
vigilantes subscribed to the civic humanist tradition of
disinterested , moderate leaders who acted only in the public
interest. The 욕후후효 feared a plausible outcome of an
unchecked popular movement , that authority would be reduced
to physical force. The paper understood the opp이εition t。
the committee as "not so much directed against the past acts
。f the Committee , as against the probable abuses to which
such organizations almost invariably lead." If the "present
excited state of the public mind ," continued , the 표A흐효
worried , it would not be long until , "it will be a question
。f physical strength between the vigilance Committee" and
the authorities. This said: the 욕후프르 bravely claimed it
did not fear a "civil war" because San Franciscans could be
trusted for their "integrity , industry , and good sense. "71
The contention that the vigilantes ’ virtue would prevent
them from abusing their power was something the 욕A후르
asserted and doubted simultaneously.
70
71
Ibid. , 12 July 1851.
Ibid. , 17 July 1851.
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Part of the reason the Al드르 continued to support the
committee (despite its obvious discomfort with the potential
it carried for social disorder) , was the hope that it would
impose a new social order. The old rowdy San Francisc。
might be swept away "by the purification and regeneration of
。ur social system and the complete restoration of our
commercial prosperity. ,, 72 It was a middle class vision for
the future.
The 표4후효:혹 increasingly equivocal support of the
committee was further illuminated in its response t。
Governor John McDougal ’ s proclamation asking Californians t。
support their state and local authorities. The governor
admitted that government may have been deficient in the past
but promised that improvements had been made that rendered
the voluntary associations of vigilantes throughout the
state unnecessary. The 관lt효 judged the Governor ’ s
proclamation to be "temperate , firm , and probably
commendable. ,, 73
This willingness to return to conventional means of law
enforcement was influenced by the perception that the
vigilantes had caused the courts to speed up their work. A
new criminal code was also seen as beneficial. The Alta
。pined that if the public officials would do their duty , the
72 Ibid. , 15 July 1851.
73 Ibid. , 23 July 1851. Other towns in California had
formed vigilance committees modeled on that of San
Francisco. See Williams , 249-250 , 374-386 , 406-407.
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vigilance committee would no longer be needed. 74 As
August began it summarized the new conditions:
The excitement of the public mind consequent
upon the proceedings of the Vigilance
Committee has nearly passed away; and
although that organization is still kept up ,
it has now more the character of a
conservator of public justice than an
executor of the law of self-preservation.
Our courts are more energetic , circumspect
and honest -- our lawyers less technical and
unscrupulous -- our police a little more
efficient -- and our citizens are more
confident , united , hopeful and determined. 75
White ’ s figures support the conclusion that the
authorities had been moved to action. In August the overall
rate of cases brought before the Recorder skyrocketed , due
to an increase of over 400 per cent , compared to July , in
the number of ordinance violations considered. Measured by
cases brought before the Recorder , property crime plummeted
by over 400 per cent between June and August , while violent
crime plunged 360 percent during the same period. 76
A newfound confidence in the authorities was exhibited
by the committee in early August. Four men implicated by
Stuart , including the notorious burglars George Adams and
74 욕It료， 26 July 1851.
75 Ibid. , 1 August 1851.
M White , passim; Mullen found that "there was little
difference in most types of reported crime for the periods
before , during , and after the activities" of the vigilance
committee. Mullen does not seem to consider the impression
minor crime might have made on the public mind. See Mullen ,
216.
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James Burns ("Jimmy from Town") , were turned over to the
authorities for prosecution. n The 표A후르 found in the
committee ’ s surrender of Adams "a declaration that our lives
and property are secure in the hands of the authorized
government." The committee ’ s recent confidence in the
authorities was fortunate as there "could not be law and
revolution co-existent." Either the "organized and legal
government must have full and entire sway , or it must be
overturned."~ The 좌4죠르 seemed relieγed that the action of
the committee had not degenerated into the overthrow of
government.
By limiting the duration and nature of their
insurrection the vigilantes left government intact. The
욕추E르 believed that San Francisco had "passed through a
revolution and ended where we began." Because in the
American tradition the distinction between popular action
and law was ambiguous , neither was invariably viewed as
superior. Practical conditions dictated the choice between
the two. And the 표It르 worried whether the time was right
for the committee to relinquish control to the authorities
(i.e. popular action give way to law). While strongly
supporting what it viewed as the committee ’ s acquiescence t。
the government , the paper wondered if the criminal element
n Williams , 288-289.
78 욕It효， 7 August 1851.
154
would perceive this as "weakness" and a return of crime ,
"malfeasance and judicial and legal corruption" would
result. 79
A COLLISION WITH THE AUTHORITIES
August began with the prospect of a rainy winter
inculcating a spirit of optimism for the important fall
trading season. "Business of every kind is reviving ," the
E추투르 happily reported.~ But the coming trading season
did not end the work of the committee. The public
perception of the committee ’ s demise impelled the committee
to publicly make clear that it had not dissolved. 81
The city ’ s tranquility was shattered on August 20 , when
a posse led by the governor and mayor made its way into the
vigilantes ’ headquarters and spirited away two men who had
purportedly been sentenced to death by the committee. 82
The direct collision between the authorities and the
committee that the Alt르 had fretted about , seemed to have
come. The 표추투르 severely condemned the "legal rescue" of the
prisoners , but also admitted its propriety:
It is a matter of serious regret that an
79 Ibid.
~ Ibid. , 11 August 1851.
~ Ibid. , 8 August 1851.
~ Williams , 294-298; Mullen , 206-207.
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。ccurrence s낀 calculated to lead to acerbity
and bitterness of feeling between the
authorities and the Vigilance Committee
should have been enacted at this late day ,
when all elements of peace and good order
were combining to render our city and State
secure against the depredations of the
lawless and the abandoned.
Yet , because of the probability that the committee was going
to execute the men , "there can be no doubt that the
authorities acted properly ," and as they were bound to do by
their oaths of office.~
Much of the blame lay with the vigilantes themselves.
"When the Vigilance Committee delivered Adams intι the hands
。f the authorities , they acknowledged by that act that the
causes which called the organization into being had ceased
to exist." It was now up to the authorities to demonstrate
that they were "competent and anxious to promote the public
good by enforcing law and punishing crime." Suggestions
that the vigilantes retake the prisoners by force were
dismissed by the Alt르 as "intemperate counsels."84 Though
the action of the authorities in seizing the prisoners was
rash , it did show their determination to act energetically
in dealing with the issue of crime. The 욕It효 was willing t。
give the courts a chance to prove their revitalization as
protectors of life and property.
On the 24th , however , the vigilantes employed a series
83 표It효， 21 August 1851.
84 Ibid.
156
。f ruses to gain access to the prisoners at the city jail.
Samuel Whittaker and Robert McKenzie , who had confessed t。
robbery to the committee , were whisked through the city t。
the committee ’ s rooms , where they were hanged almost
immediately.85
The 관후토르 was disturbed and troubled by the incident but
ultimately sustained the committee. Two events connected
with the affair particularly offended ~he paper's
sensibilities. A man whose normal occupation was that of a
humorist , gave a "severe" speech advocating that Whittaker
and McKenzie be forcefully taken from the authorities.
After applauding these remarks , several in the crowd
requested he sing a satirical song (liThe Old Common Council
have Vamoosed the Ranch"). The 욕J도효 was scandalized by this
frivolity on such a serious occasion.~ Then , during the
hanging itself , some of the crowd shouted their approval and
a few vigilantes stood behind the executed men and
recognized friends in the audience. This behavior
exhibited , lectured the 욕A후효， "very little reverence for the
sacredness and solemnity of death , to say the least. "87
This sort of conduct was not acceptable in popular action
that was to be moderate and dignified. It suggested the
danger of unchecked popular action.
85 Williams , 299-302; Mullen , 207-208.
~ 표L후효， 22 August 1851.
~ Ibid. , 25 August 1851.
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But the taking and hanging of the prisoners was
approved of by the 관It효. "Whilst we regret that the
Vigilance Committee have by this act , been brought int。
direct collision with the constituted authorities , we cannot
but approve their course in executing the two criminals."
The hangings stemmed from the "terrible effects of misrule"
and were the ‘’ fruits of maladministered laws." Happily the
paper perceived a "settled determination on the part of the
body politic to have justice done."M One result of the
summer ’ s vigilantism was a public desire for order.
The stimulation of a sense of public spirit was the
legacy of the committee in thε 욕￡흐효;효 mind. "Their
determined and considerate action has restored public
confidence." 89 Because of the committee ’ s work "there is
an end to the sentiment of insecurity." And should th낸re be
a threat to public peace and order in the future , the
example of the vigilance committee had awakened "a power
competent and determined to preserve it."~
Although the 좌A후르 returned to the vigilante fold
following the hanging of Whittaker and Mckenzie , the
incident took its toll on the committee ’ s support. A
contemporary reported that the "brutal levity [which]
characterized the execution … so shocked public sentiment
88
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that the popular approval of the Committee was greatly
weakened , and contributions were withdrawn."~ A religious
paper , the Pacific , which had supported the committee
previously, condemned the hanging.~
POLITICS?
There was disagreement brewing within the committee as
to how it should proceed. Some of the vigilantes wanted t。
get the committee directly involved in politics. The
endorsement (by 14 vigilantes) of an "Independent" ticket
moved the Al후효 to proclaim that the ticket had "been
sanctioned by most of the members of the vigilance
committee. 써3 Later , however , the ticket , was officially
repudiated by the committee. A resolution was adopted and
printed in the papers that expressed the committee ’ s belief
that "it is ruinous to the objects of our formation for us
to recognize any ticket of a political character. "94
The 욕L흐르 quickly took up the committee ’ s official
position that the Independent candidates were not sanctioned
by the committee. But the paper did see the slate of
candidates as the culmination of what it hoped for the
91 Williams , 301.
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committee:
a political step of this kind , characterized
by such fairness and consistency -- stamped
with the honest intention and patriotic
desire of a numerous class of our best
citizens -- would , naturally enough , be
regarded as a vigilance nomination by all wh。
respect the cause in which men sacrifice
selfish and personal considerations_Jor the
accomplishment of the general good. 95
A call for a meeting regarding the Independent (or non-
partisan) ticket was signed by 203 men , of whom something
more than a third were vigilantes. The call emphasized the
signatories connection with the committee. The "great
interests for which many of us have labored the last three
months ," an obvious reference to the work of the committee ,
the announcement asserted , could only be culminated by
electing a non-partisan ticket to govern San Francisco. 96
At the meeting over 1500 men pledged themselves to the non-
partisan ticket. In the September election the Independents
purportedly controlled 1000 to 1300 votes of the
approximately 5700 cast. While Independents who also had
the endorsement of the Whigs or Democrats won , no candidate
running only as an Independent won. w
It is clear that individual members of the committee
were deeply involved in the election. And the ticket was
not without its detractors. Some charged that it was
95
96
Ibid. , 28 August 1851.
Ibid. , 29 August 1851.
W Williams , 324-326.
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controlled by the "landed interest" and dubbed it the
"Monopolist" ticket. Committee president , Stephen Payran ,
was accused of attempting to coerce the vigilance committee
to support his candidacy for County Recorder , a charge he
vigorously denied.~
The division that accompanied the committee ’ s foray
into politics and the hangings of Whittaker and Mckenzie
illustrated the misgivings and doubts of some vigilantes as
to the committee ’ s proper role and the bounds , if any , on
its conduct. The vitality of the committee seeped away in
late August and September as several members resigned. 99
The Executive Committee reported on September 6, that "Our
labours are now completed. ,, 1oo
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
In the autumn of 1851 the vigilance committee faded but
did not disappear. A new executive committee of forty-five
was elected and the general committee adjourned. This new
executive committee did not have the power to make arrests
and its main purpose was to watch over the city and summon
the general committee should an emergency arise. There were
a few minor incidents over the next several months but , for
practical purposes , the active operations of the committee
had been suspended. The executive committee continued t。
meet , but with decreasing frequency.'
In May 1856 , the committee reorganized. As the 1856
committee was much larger than the 1851 committee there were
many new members , but there were also holdovers from the
earlier committee. The membership certificates of the 1856
committee bore the inscription "Reorganized ," and the
。fficial medal were imprinted , "Organized 9th June , 1851.
, Mary Floyd Williams , Historv of the San Francisc。
Committee of Viailance of 1851 (Berkeley , California:
University of California Press , 1921; reprint , New York: De
Capo Press , 1969) , 336-355.
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Reorganized 14th May , 1856. ,, 2 The immediate causes of the
revival of the vigilance committee were the killings of U.S.
Marshal W.H. Richardson and bombastic newspaper editor James
King of William. The vigilantes declared that San
Francisc。 ’ s government was fundamentally corrupted. A
false-bottomed ballot box , reputed to have been used in the
1854 city elections , served as a symbol of the subversion of
the democratic process. 3 Over the summer the vigilantes
hanged four men ,4 banished dozens , intercepted a shipment
of federal arms on its way to the state militia , and even
arrested and jailed a justice of the state supreme court.
In August , a vigilante contingent 6,000 strong , marched
through the city in a symbolic closing of the committee ’ s
work. 5
2
In reality vigilantism was but the first phase of
Ibid. , 400-40 1.
3 Robert M. Senkewicz , Viailantes in Gold Rush San
Francisc。 (Stanford , California: Stanford University Press ,
1985) , 118; Hubert Howe Bancroft , The Works of Hubert Howe
Bancroft vol. 37 , Popular Tribunals vol. 2 , (San Francisco:
The History Company , 1887) , has an illustration of the
infamous ballot box , 7.
4 The death toll of the committee might be placed at
five if the suicide of James Sullivan , who killed himself
while in vigilante custody , is included. Philip J.
Ethington , "The Structures of Urban Political Life:
Political Culture in San Francisco , 1850-1880" (Ph.D. diss. ,
Stanford University , 1991) , 93; Roger W. Lotchin , 흐르므
Francisco , 1846-1856: F’rom Hamlet to Citv (Lincoln , Nebraska
and London: University of Nebraska Press , 1974) , 194; Josiah
Royce , California: F‘rom the Conauest in 1846 to the Second
Viailance Committee in San Francisc。 (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin , 1886; reprint , New York: Alfred A. Knopf , 1948) ,
360; Senkewicz states that Sullivan was deported , 1'/3.
5 Williams , 401-403; Ethington , 92-93.
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the group ’ s labors. The committee converted itself into the
People ’ s Party and was the preeminent political power in San
Francisco for the next ten years.
Many of the members of the vigilance committee of 1851
had been reluctant to enter the political arena under the
vigilante banner. The committee ’ s ambivalence resulted in a
dissipation of vigilante energy. In the public mind the
vigilantes had not gone too far because they had left
government intact. This was important because it allowed
the 1851 committee to become a sYmbol of civic
responsibility. Vigilantism became an honored phase of
community building in San Francisco and this can be
understood in light of the American tradition that glorified
revolution and representative government.
The vigilantes (supposedly , at least) succeeded in
securing life and property and stimulating more effective
lawenforcement (i.e. more effective government).6
Sympathizers of the committee felt that the vigilantes had
not harmed government because their actions had taken place
。utside of government. Their exercise of authority had been
justified by a notion of popular sovereignty that power
6 Lotchin , Senkewicz , and Peter Decker suggest the
1851 committee had the temporary effect of reducing crime.
Bancroft agrees with them: "The reformation of 1851 was
superficial and temporary; that of 1856 radical and
permanent." Bancroft , vo l. 37 , 531; Lotchin , 194;
Senkewicz , 88; Decker , Fortunes and Failures: White Collar
Mobility in Nineteenth-Century San Francisc。 (Cambridge ,
Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press , 1978) ,
124.
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ultimately rested in the people. Thus while honoring the
revolutionary experience of America , they had also honored
its ideal of government. The committee was at once forceful
and moderate , dangerous and stabilizing. It was the threat
the committee posed to existing government that made it a
formidable force for social control. The vigilantes had
acted as the sovereign people without destroying the
creation of the sovereign people.
For its supporters the vigilance committee was the
exemplar of popular action. The vigilantes of 1856 took
advantage of the reverence for the 1851 committee and
purs갑ed its logical conclusion: political power.
The vigilance committee of 1856 has often been
characterized as a revolution.? But this is too strong an
appellation. The vigilantes never exercised popular
constituent sovereignty to change the form of government. 8
On the contrary , after briefly flouting the law , they
joined , and largely constituted , the establishment. The
People ’ s Party that the vigilantes organized dominated San
Francisco for the next ten years. But the People ’ s Party ’ s
candidates stood for election like other aspirants t。
? Royce called the 1856 committee a "Business Man's
Revolution ," 346; Lotchin discusses the "Revolution of
1856 ," 261-263; Bancroft called the 1856 movement "one of
the grandest moral revolutions the world has ever
witnessed , ’I vol. 37 , 531 , but rejected the characterization
of vigilantism in California as politically revolutionary ,
see vol. 36 , 28 , 42.
8 Bancroft , vol. 36 , 42.
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political power. The vigilante power ultimately acquiesced
to political institutions.
Vigilantes , as individuals and as a group , exercised
power directly. Their authority carne from themselves; it
was their individual and collective shares of sovereignty
that sanctioned their actions. In contrast , political
authorities do not utilize their own share of sovereignty
but act as agents of the people; their power is vested in
them by others. Thus others can take that power away. The
。nly check on vigilante conduct , as the 욕A후효 had nervously
understood , was their personal virtue. Vigilantes cannot be
voted out of power. They must either retire of their own
prerogative or be driven out by force. But a political
party can be voted out of power. When the vigilantes
conformed to orthodox methods of governance by entering the
political arena , they voluntarily altered the way in which
they exercised authority. They gave up the direct , physical
potency of vigilantism for a consignment of power from the
electorate to whom they remained accountable.
Power naturally inheres in men according to the theory
。f popular sovereignty.> It exists outside and independent
。f government. In an unadulterated condition , popular
sovereignty closely resembles anarchy. The strong impose
their will through force; the force of numbers.
During the early years of the gold rush , California
seemed almost to be in a state of nature. Institutions were
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weak and poorly developed. The proliferation of mining
camps required that informal mechanisms of government be set
up repeatedly. Men in California came to be familiar with
the direct exercise of sovereign power. The imposition of
social order by the community ’ s most vigorous elements ,
through force , was an accepted way of life in California.
The vigilantes in San Francisco reflected this feature of
life in California.
The American tradition has recognized the power of
popular sovereignty in its Declaration of Independence. But
the nation has been sustained by the integration of this
power into government as embodied by the Constitution. A
revolutionary impulse lives on , but it has been subordinated
to government. In San Francisco , the 1856 vigilance
committee closed the circle that had been opened by the gold
rush. The powerful vigilantes decided to throw themselves
into conventional government.
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